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1.
CHAFTSE I
Evolution of the Food Distribution System
The story of the development of the modem food market is a
history of economic change
—
growth in urhan papulation, decline in home
production, discovery and use of modem means of transportation and
preservation^ discovery and use of technological improvement and scien-
tific management, transition from the general store to the super market
of today.
There could he no extensive grourth of the food distribution
system nntil there were means of transporting bulky and perishable food
stuffs from distant growers to places of consiamption. However, there
was no need for food stores as such as long as families produced most
of their own food supply. As towns grew, skilled crafts developed and
craftsmen opened shops to take orders from customers or to display their
wares. Pood stuffs were still largely home-produced, supplemented by
weekly purchases in the central market place to which nearby farmers
brought their surplus products. The traveling peddler carried spices
with other luxuries primarily for the wealthy. Then came the spice
dealer, the forerunner of today's grocer, who gradually added to his
stock other articles not locally producible such as salt, sugar, tea
and coffee. In the general store, which was the characteristic retail
establishment of our early history, these articles were the major items
of the grocery department.
As towns flourished, more and more families found it expedient
to buy their floor and meal instead of taking their own grain to the

mill for grinding. They also found it convenient to have fresh meat
all the year round "by the estahlishment of a local slaughter house and
meat market. The individual grocer, the food manufacturer and proces-
ser, and the wholesaler came on the scene. With the development of
rapid means of transportation, the less perishahle of the fruits and
vegetables could be shipped long distances and city populations could
be fed. By means of the refrigerator car and other cold storage methods,
even the most perishable foods could come to the city market. Before
long, meats from central packing houses and eggs and dairy products
from central warehouses became part of the grocer's stock in trade.
The canning industry sprung up, home baking decreased and we soon had
the traditional channels of distribution—manufacturer to wholesaler
to retailer.
Each member of this chain had a vital interest in its preser-
vation; it insured to both the wholesaler and retailer not only a
maximum flow of goods but their life's blood. They were compensated
for the services they rendered by a system of markups. (This does not
apply to brokers, selling or purchasing agents who operate on a commis-
sion basis.) Should a retailer buy directly from the manufacturer and
secure equal or more favorable terms than those granted to and by his
wholesaler, he was then able to undersell competitive grocers in the
retail market. The wholesaler located in his territory would lose his
business and other retailers in the area would lose customers. Pew
manufacturers, therefore, would care to risk offending the wholesalers
and retailers handling their products. Thus, if they sold direct at
all, they were ccureful to protect the wholesaler's margin by offering
II
goods at higher prices than those availahle to middlemen. This differ-
ential is known as the "functional discount" and represents recognition
of and compensation for the services of assembly, warehousing and credit
extension performed "by wholesalers. A similar discount guards the
differential between the price to the retailer and the price to the con-
sumer.
The "quantity discount" represents recognition of the economies
of manufacture or distribution resulting from the placing of large orders
while "functional discounts" constitute payment for services performed.
Discounts based solely on quantity were regarded in far less favorable
light since any special advantages secured by a large distributor which
were not available to smaller competitors of the same level might result
in a disturbance of the resale market. In general* therefore, manufac-
turers and processors avoided any significant discrimination between
their wholesalers who followed similar policies with respect to retailers.
Hence, this channel of distribution became well entrenched and was ac-
cepted as the natural order of things.
Since the turn of the century, however, various new methods
of distribution have appeared and have constituted an increasing challenge
to the traditional system. Such methods are the chain store, the various
adaptations of the chain store method of operation and recently, the super
market. While a number of chains were established during the latter half
of the nineteenth century, (The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Con^jany in
1858), their real growth occurred during the present century. It is
estimated that in I9OO there were but 700 chains of all kinds with 45OO
stores. In 1920 there were 9.^00 chains operating i+9,200 stores, in 1930,

7,061 chains operated 159,638 stores, and in 1939 there were 123,195
chain store outlets. Chain store sales for all types of business
rose from of all retail trade in 1919 to 22, in 1935- In the
field of food distribution the chain plays its most important role for
in 1939, one-third of all chain store retail units and 31;^ of all sales
made by those Tinits were accounted for "by grocery chains.
The most important sixigle type of outlet utilized by grocery
manufacturers has been the wholesaler. Over one-third of the total
sales of grocery and meat products has been distributed through this
type of middleman.
Manufacturers' wholesale branches accounted for approximately
one-fourth of the total sales of all food and grocery producers. They
were used by manufacturers of processed foods other than meat for the
disposal of nearly 155^ of their sales and by prodiKsers of inedible
grocery items for the distribution of 3^ of their volume. In the meat
trade, packers' branches were used for slightly over ^5^ 0^ tl^e total
meat sales. Sales were made direct from manufacturers to retailers to
the extent of 27.7^ of total grocery sales and through manufacturers'
retail branches to the constimer to the extent of 3»2/^ of all grocery
sales . (3) Thus by 1929, the wholesaler's share of the business had
been greatly reduced by various devices, although he still retained a
(1) U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 19^0, Retail Trade ,
1939, page 5-
(2) Beckman, T. N. and Nolen, H. C, The Chain Store Problem . New York,
McGraw-Hill. 1938, p. 38.
(3) Engle, "The Marketing Structure in the Grocery Industry", Harvard
Business Review , Vol. XII, No. 3, April, 193^, PP- 321-323-

position of dominance in the trade.
Operating expenses during 1929 of the Tirokers and agents, the
cash and carry wholesalers and the chain store warehouses were the lowest
of all types of wholesale distributors and reflects the limited marketing
functions they perform. Of the 23^ chain warehouses studied, total expen-
ses of 108 were less than k^j^ of net sales while 1,853 of the ^,776 general
line wholesalers had operating expenses ranging from i*- to 8/^ of net sales
and had expenses of from 8 to 12^.
Because they have eliminated many of the functions of the Inde-
pendent retail grocer, chains have cut their operating expenses per store
down "below that of the independent. Chains have eliminated, in the main,
credit extension and delivery service and have instituted the cash and
carry system. Self-service, characteristic of the super market which was
"borne of the depression and introduced by independents, reduced costs still
more "by reducing the size of the sales force per dollar of sales. Since
19^0, chains have taken the lead away from the independents and have con-
verted almost entirely to super market operation. More extensive advertis-
ing due to regional unity and the use of leader tactics "because of superior
financial resources have enabled the chain to gain more volume per unit and
there'by reduce costs. It is doubtful if scientific management and special-
ization as used by chains has reduced expenses per se "but such division of
labor must be used to maintain efficient operation. Of course the integ-
ration of wholesaler-retailer functions makes for lower chain expenses.
Even the large independent super market operator integrates such functions
(l) Ibid., p. 332.

6.
when he "buys direct and uses part of his store as a warehouse.
The net cost of merchandise sold 'by chains and snper markets,
be they chain or independent, is lower than that sold hy service inde-
pendents because their size enables them to purchase large quantities
and thereby secure quantity discounts. The quantity discounts may or
may not reflect actual savings in cost of production and distribution but
may represent the bargaining power of the larger chain buyer.
Promotional allowances are given to chains and seldom to inde-
pendents for many reasons. Some manufacturers feel that their advertising
Is more effective if it appears in the advertisements of a well-known retail
chain. Others feel that window and counter displays can best be handled by
the central headquarters of a chain rather than dealing separately with
numerous independents. These promotional allowances are payments for a
specific service and reach considerable totals. In 193^» the Kroger Grocery
& Baking Company received $53^.758 in promotional allowances, the First
National Stores, Inc., received $3^2,121 and The General Poods Corporation
allowed the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company 5/^ off its list price for
promotional services.
With regard to brokerage fees, these may or may not reflect actual
services performed for a man\ifax:turer and are very controversial in nature.
A manufactixrer who prices his goods on the assumption that he will have to
pay a brokerage fee may pay said fee to a chain which pxirchases through its
regional buying offices direct from the manufacturer. In 193^ Kroger*
s
brokerage earnings on canned food and flour alone totaled $236,209, while
(l) Hearings before the Special Committee on Investigation of American Retail
Pederation, House of Representatives, 70th Congress, 1st Session, 1935.

7the total "brokerage earnings of A. & "P. for the same year were ahout
$2,000,000.
The proportion of sales going to chains and independents has
varied slightly from 1929 to 19^5- Prior to 1947
Tahie 1.
Sales of Grocery and Com"bination Stores
Year
1929 1931 1933 1937 1939 19^1 19^3 19^5 19^ 1947 1948
Chain 32^ ji4 32^ Jk^ 375^ 32^ 32^ 3^4 3^i 39^
Independent 68 66 63 68 66 63 68 68 66 62 61
Source: Facts in Food & Grocery Distrl'bution as of January . 1949 .
Progressive Grocer, New York, 1949, p. 3»
chains received their largest share of the retail groceiry market in 1933
when the depression forced many independents to go "by the hoard. The 193^-
1937 recovery plus state chain stores taxes aided the growth of Independents
in 1937. Except for the war years when scarcity of goods, CPA ceilings and
labor shortages caused chains to lose ground, the trend of grocery chains'
share of the retail grocery market has "been climbing since 1940 due in large
part to their advocacy of the svq^eT market method of operation and the growth
of small chain organizations.
])uring the early thirties the wholesaler and the independent
retailer faced, in their opinion, the threat of possible extinction because
of inroads made by the chain grocery stores. The history of the many at-
tempts on the part of both distributors to seek a panacea to maintain them-
selves and their traditional methods of distribution is a long ind interesting
(1) Ibid., p. 11

one. A review of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the National Recovery Act and the Robinson-Patman Act
would he in most instances a review of such attentpts.
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CHAPTER II
History of the RoTjIus on-Patman Act
A. Background
1. Evolution of Antl-TruBt Laws
The Robins on-Patman Act Is not a new type of government regulation;
it Is rather an attempt to define and an^llfy the price discrimination
section (Section 2 (a)) of the Clayton Act. This latter act has heen on the
statute "books since 191^ and In itself was an endeavor to Improve the ad-
ministration of the Sherman Act of 1890.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed primarily as a result of
the wave of resentment and antipathy toward the trust movement of the 1870 's
and 1880*8. Previous to the rise of the great industrial comhinatlons such
as the Standard Oil combine, the prevailing governmental philosophy, especial-
ly with regard to the food industry, had been one of laissez faire. By
preventing monopolistic interference with free competition, this law was
designed to restore the economic conditions on which the laissez faire policy
was predicated. The Sherman Law was to outlaw all contracts, combinations
and conspiracies which restrained trade, and it barred monopolies and at-
tempts to monopolize trade. Price discrimination in the oil industry and
in the form of railroad rebates were the first examples of discrimination,
as such, that attracted public attention.
The language of the Sherman Act was too vague to encompass many
undoubtedly monopolistic practices, however, and in 191^ the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act were passed in an attempt to supple-
ment, fortify and reenforce the Sherman Act and to create an agency whose

duty it was to detect and prohlTiit unfair methods of competition.
These two acts marked a new step along the road of Industrial
legislation for they altered "both the scope and method of government reg-
ulation. The aims of policy were reaffirmed, "but now direct regulation of
specific "business practices and policies to assure free competition in the
production and distri"bution of goods was added to the negative regulation
of "business relationships which had "been instituted in 1890. An adminis-
trative process of detection and condemnation of "unfair methods of
competition" was added as well as the outlawing of certain types of com-
petitive methods sxich as price discrimination, interlocking directorates,
the tying of contracts and the acquisition of capital stock in competing
corporations which had "been found to "be particularly dangerous to the
public interest.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act forbade discrimination in price,
""between different purchasers of commodities" not "based upon
"differences in the grade, quality or quantity of
the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance
for difference in the cost of selling or transportation,
or made in good faith to meet competition, where the
effect of such discrimination may "be to su"bstantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." (l)
It left to the courts the prohlem of deciding when competition was "su'bstan-
tially lessened" or a monopoly was "being created, and as a result, this
seriously limited the instances of discrimination with which the Federal
Trade Commission could deal*
The Clayton Act, like the Sheirman Act, had a checkered course of
Cl) U. S, Government Printing Office, "Antitrust Laws with Amendments
1890-1945", m5, p. 22.

enforcement
.
"Boring the period in which the chain stores were
enjoying an extensive growth, the coorts held that
discrimination which injured only competition of the
"buyer and not of the seller was subject to law." (l)
In 1929. however, the Supreme Court ruled in the Van Camp Case that the
section applied to a lessening of competition among "buyers as well as
sellers. tj^Q decision involving the Ladogo Canning Company and the
American Can Company wherein a buyer was permitted to recover substantial
damages from a seller who had discriminated against him in favor of another
customer, this interpretation of section 2 of the Clayton Act was reen
—
forced. Nevertheless, the "broad problem of price differentials was
virtually untouched due to poor legislative drafting, "bungling "by the
lower courts, an unimaginative and ineffectual commission and an unconcerned
public. Hardly ai^ effort had been made under Section 2 to restrain the
"buying methods of mass distributors.
When the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in 1933f i*
appeared to be a fair way to limit the methods of doing business. However,
it soon became evident that code proposals were not entirely limited by any
abstract concept of unfairness but that attempts were being made to use the
code structure as a weapon to maintain the traditional channels of distribu-
tion. This was especially trae of the food and drug business. In these
industries, those who followed the traditional methods were still in the
majority and were considered and accepted by the NRA as the accredited
(1) Mennen v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 744, cert, denied 262
U. S. 759; National Bisc\iit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 299
Fed. 733.
(2) Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co. 278 U. S. 245.
(3) American Can Co. v. L&Loga Canning Co. 44 Fed. (2d) 763

spokesmen for their respective industries. Accordingly, the mass dis-
trihutors who failed to conform to the orthodox pattern of di8tri"bution
found themselves targets of many attacks. Code proposals were drafted to
limit such competitive advantages as the favorahle purchasing "benefits which
were enjoyed "by the "big fellows. Wholesalers, in particular, in drawing up
their code programs sought to insure an adequate flow of goods through their
hands "by stemming its diversion to newer channels. A code which gave ex-
plicit recognition to the principle of the wholesale differential was formu-
lated and a "boycott of manixfsicturers was even resorted to in order to enforce
this code. The "buying advantages ("brokerage, discounts and promotional
allowances) granted to the chains were assailed in an attempt to use the
codes as instruments for strengthening the traditional methods of distri"bu-
tion. Retailers centered their attention on the price level and codes were
drawn up that set a floor to prices, limited losses and restricted leader
merchandising. However, with the aholishment of the NHA, these efforts
failed and newer, more specific means of curtallizig the advantages of the
mass distri"butors were examined.
Buying advantages of the chain stores now came under direct at-
tack. Proponents of this attack claimed that the cause of distress among
independent dealers, "both wholesalers and retailers, was the ability of
the mass distri^butors to receive unjustifia"ble concessions from producers.
They proposed to set a legal limit "based on the cost of such price differ-
entials. This principle is the "basis of the Robins on-Patman Act.
2. Federal Trade Commission Chain Store Inqxxiry
The soil for the Ro"binson-Patman Act was prepared in an investiga-

tlon of chain store practices conducted by the Federal Trade Commission.
The Senate, "becoming increasingly concerned over the distress of small
dealers, the growth of chains and the huge concentration of "btiying power
in the hands of the latter, directed the Federal Trade Commission to make
a thorough study of the chain store system of marketing and distribution,
to report its findings and to recommend what legislation, if any, should
"be enacted to regulate and control that form of distriTmtion.
After seven years, during which time the Commission had prepared
thirty-three individual reports covering various phases and activities of
chain store growth and operation, a final report was submitted to Congress
on December 14, 193k, The investigating body found that the growth and
development of chain stores resulted not only from their scientific man-
agerial efficiency, but also from their ability to obtain goods at lower
costs and to undersell the independents. report anialyzed in
detail the various methods used by chains to gain special concessions and
allowances from manufacturers. It summarized the preferential treatment
granted chains by manufacturers into the following general classifications:
volume allowances, promotional allowances, allowances in lieu of brokerage,
freight allowances and guarantees against price decline.
Volume allowances were classified as straight volume allowances
with or without specified quotas, progressive discounts increasing with
volume, discounts for increases in volume over some prior periodCs) and
all other volume allowances not specified.
(1) Senate Resolution No. 224, 70th Congress, 1st Session, May 12, 1928.
(2) Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on Chain Store Investigation .
Senate Document No. 4, 74th Congress, 1st Session, December 14, 1934.

Promotional allowances were classified as allowances granted for
newspaper advertising, window and counter displays and special promotions
and deals featured "by the buyer.
"Vniere preferences are granted in the form of promotion-
al allowances without the rendition of services in
return, they are, in effect, price concessions having
no direct relation to quality of goods, quantity
purchased or cost of selling." (l'
Apparently chains "benefited to a much greater extent than the
wholesalers from these allowances. The Commission's figures indicated that,
"more manufacturers make allowances to chains than make
s\ich allowances to wholesalers, and the proportion of
chain accoants carrying allowances was far greater than
the proportion of wholesale accoants." (2)
"In 1930* for example, the rates of special allowances
on total sales of all reporting manufacturers to
grocery chains was 2.02^ as compared with 0.91^ to
wholesalers. In groceries, the chain allowances were
"between I5 and 16 times those paid to the wholesalers,
though the chain bought less than 8 times the amounts
purchased "by the wholesalers included in this study," (3)
Table 2.
Manufacturers Allowances Granted to Chains and Wholesalers
, 1930
Type of
Business
Tobacco
Grocery
Drug
Total
Allowances
$6,928,000
6,439.000
3.798,000
S ource
:
Chain
Allowances
$6,122,000
5,840,000
2,848,000
Wholesale
Allowances
$806,000
354, 000
911.000
Per cent of Total
Chain Wholesale
88
91
75
Federal Trade Commission, Jinal Report on Chain Store
Investigation , Senate Document No. 4, 74th Congress,
1st Session, December 14, 1934, p. 58
12
5
24
Cl) Ibid. p. 60
(2) Ibid. p. 57
(3) Ibid. p. 59

The Commission reviewed the extent to which chains were engaged
in interstate commerce and found that, since chains transported their o*m
goods across state lines to their various stores, purchased for shipment in
other states and took delivery in still other states, they were therefore
engaged in interstate commerce. In considering the chain system from the
point of view of possihle monopolies, the Federal Trade Commission reported
that,
"in view of the competition "between different chains
and the independent dealers and the extent to which
the chains have invaded the retail dlstrihutiaa field,
there was no indication of a monopolization of the
field." (l)
As a result of the investigation, the Commission submitted a list
of recommendations which divided the factors contributing to the competitive
advantages of chains into two groups—those which appear to "be susceptible
to federal regulatory legislation and those which would be amenable only to
extraordinary governmental measures.
In the first group were included:
1. The special discounts and allowances made to chains.
2. The use of leader and loss-leader merchandise sold
at prices below cost.
3. Short weighing which was found to be more prevalent
among chains than among independents.
The second grotip was comprised of
1. The services granted by the independents which have
been eliminated by the chains.
2. The lower wages paid by the chains in some localities.
3. Elimination of the wholesale selling expenses by the
integrated set-up of chains.
(1) Ibid. p. 68
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k. The wider profit margins on the chains' private
"branded merchandise.
5. Profits from the chain wholesaling operation.
6. More advantageous newspaper advertising of the
chains
.
7. The ability of the chains to average profits
ohtained from their stores in various localities.
The Commission pointed out that in prosecuting those practices
of the first group which have heen amenahle Tinder Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, its efforts had "been "blocked "by the courts. It was not until 1929 in
the Van Camp Case that the Supreme Court held that the price discrimination
provision of Section 2 of the Clayton Act applied to a lessening of competi-
tion in the resale of a commodity. Prior to that time, the courts had held
that only a lessening of cosrpetition in the line of commerce of the seller
was intended hy the Act.
The Federal Trade Commission finally recommended that Section 2
of the Clayton Act "be amended to prohibit unfair and unjust price discrimi-
nation to read as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in any transaction in or affecting such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate unfairly or
unjustly in price between purchasers of commodities,
which commodities are sold for use, consumption or
resale within the United, States or any Territories thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possessions or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States." (l)
The Cramiission's suggestions were incorporated in bills introduced
in the First Session of the 7^th Congress in January, 1935 » by Representative
Mapes, but they were ultimately superseded by the more drastic Patman Bill.
(1) Federal Trade Commission, qp. cit, p. 96

17.
B. The Roblns on-Patman Act
1. Legislative Course
The bill which eventually became the Eohinson-Patman Act was
drafted and sponsored by the United States Vfholesale Grocers Association
which represented at that time 205^ of the wholesale grocery trade. Food
brokers through the National ffood Brokers Association, an organization
composed of almost 65/^ of the general food brokers, joined the fight. In
a speech delivered before the anmial convention of the National Association
of Retail Grocers on June 19. 1935. at Indianapolis, Indiana, Mr. Howard L.
Scott, president of the N. P. B. A. stated the broker's position as follows:
"The policy of the Association is clear and simple. The
food broker is fighting to have unfair price discrimi-
nation abolished by law or agreement. As right thinking
men and women raise their voices in protest against the
evils of price discrimination in favor of the large and
powerful in the grocery industry and against the small
and independent, we will find a perfectly proper, legal
and constitutional way to abolish the evil." (l)
Joined with the wholesale grocers, brokers and independent retail-
ers was an association of retail druggists who had lost, as a result of the
N. R. A. decision, a code which gave them far greater privileges than any
other retail code. Anxious to recover these lost privileges, the druggists
joined the food distributors to form a powerful lobby. ^2)
This militant minority achieved the enactment of legislation
affecting virtually everj'' business in the United States. Originally drafted
by Mr. H. T. Teegarden, attorney for the United States Wholesalers Associ-
(1) National Pood Brokers Association, "Unfairness in the Pood Industry",
1935. p. 1
(2) Sammons, "Legislative History", Business and the Robins on-Patman Law ,
1938, pp. 103-lOif

ation, the "bill had a tortuous congressional course and the form in which
it was finedly enacted represented an amalgamation of a series of legislative
proposals originating with the Patman Act, introduced by Representative
Wright Patman on June 11, 1935- Joint hearings were held beginning on
July 10, 1935 and extending through the last session of the 7^th Congress
covering the Patman Act and H. E. ^995 an<i H. R. 5062 introduced by Rep-
resentative Mapes. Unable to reach a conclusion on the basis of its
first hearings, the Committee entrusted the bills to a subcommittee headed
by Representative Utterback who then introduced his own bill, H, R. 10^86,
some features of which were ultimately incorporated in the Patman Bill. On
March 31» 1936, the House Committee favorably reported the Patman Bill in
somewhat modified form.
On Jtine 26, 1935 1 shortly after the introduction of the Patman
Bill in the House, Senator Robinson introduced an identical measure, S. 315^«
The Senate Committee on Judiciary favorably reported the bill with amendments
on February 3, 1936. In the interim. Senators Borah and Van Nuys introduced
separate measures designed to prohibit price discrimination. They consol-
idated their bills into a single measure, S. ^171, on March 4, 1936, and
when the Robinson Bill came to a vote in the Senate on April 23 and 2^, the
Borah-Van Nuys measure was attached to it as a floor amendment.
The Patman Bill was passed by the House on May 28, 1936, and after
a short conference with the Robinson Bill, the Committee reported a revised
bill on June 8, 1936, which was adopted by the House and Senate without
(l) Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8^2, H. R. ^995.
H. R. 5062
—
7^th Congress, 1st Session.
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farther change.
The lobbying groi^js promoted the law as an anti-chain store hill
and employed the catch-word "monopoly" in its efforts to save the inde-
pendent dealer. The "background of the investigation dealt primarily with
chain store competition and most of the congressional discussion evolved
about the food distribution system.
Scant attention by industry as a whole was paid to the measure
xmtil it had been favorably reported by the Senate on April 2k, 1936. Since
the Act was rushed through to con5>letion in little more than a month's time,
the opposition had little chance to consolidate forces or to bring pressure
to bear upon Congress.
Actually the Act represented another manifestation of the wide-
spread feeling against "big business" which commenced with the Sherman Act
and gained acceleration under the New Deal.
2. Provisions of the Robins on-Patman Act
This Act has been well named the "Anti-Price Discrimination Act"
for the fundamental idea underlying its various provisions is that any two
competing buyers must be treated alike, first, as to the price they are asked
to pay for the merchandise, and second, as to the availability of allowances
and services which are reflected in price or which constitute a disguised
reduction in price. ^2) addition, certain subterfuges such as the al-
lowance of brokerage where no services are rendered or where commission is
given to a btiyer are to be abolished. Also, the buyer who knowingly receives
(1) Washington Post, The Robins on-Patman Act—Its History and Probable
Meaning
, 1936. pp. 8-9.
(2) Tor the official wording of the Act see Appendix.

the "benefit of a discriminatory price is made eqtially responsilale with the
seller who grants it.
In structure, the Act consists of four sections. The first of
these amends Section 2 of the Clayton Act by substituting for it six new
subsections lettered (a) to (f ) respectively. Section 2 is a purely pro-
cedural provision relating only to right of action and proceedings pending
at the time of the enactment of the law. Section 3 is a wholly new crim-
inal statute embodying the provisions of the Borah-Van Nuys Bill. It is
not an amendment to the Clayton Act but a separate and distinct law making
certain types of discrimination a criminal offense. Section k of the Act
relates to cooperative associations and exempts the internal functions of
the cooperative from the operation of the law.
Subsection (a) is the basic provision prohibiting discrimination
in price between customers of a seller. It is designed to regulate sellers
from discriminating in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption
or resale within the United States or possessions, and where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
This section of the law does not prohibit all differentials in
price; under it, all six of the following factors must be present before a
differential is deemed unlawful. These factors are:
1. There must be discrimination between two or more
customers of a given seller.
2. The difference in price must be made in connection
with commodities of "like grade and quality".
3. At least one of the purchases involved must be in
interstate commerce.
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4. The commodities involved must have been sold for
"use, consumption, or resale" within the juris-
diction of the United States.
5» The transaction must involve the sale of commod-
ities and not the sale of services.
6. Although each of the above factors is present,
a discrimination is not unlawful unless, in ad-
dition to the above, its effect may:
(a) Substantially lessen competition
in any line of commerce; or
(b) Tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce; or
(c) Injure, destroy, or prevent
competition.
The presence of a price differential does not by itself make the
differential a violation of Section 2 (a). The law specifically allows for
quantity discounts to different purchasers where the discrimination in
price makes allowances for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery.
A price discrimination which has in it the required elements may
be justified if it is merely due to price changes made from time to time in
accordance with changing conditions affecting the marketability of the goods
concerned, s"uch as deterioration of perishable goods, sales by court process,
obsolescence of seasonal goods, or discontinuance sales of the goods concerned.
There are market factors which induce price variations such as changes in raw
material prices, labor and selling cost changes, changes in consumer demand
and other trade conditions which influence price. A price differential may
also be justified if it is shown that it meets an equally low price of a
competitor. This statement allows for a defensive differential made to
meet the competition that exists between national and local distributors.
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The right of a seller to select his customers and to refuse to
deal with purchasers for any reasons deemed sufficient hy him is guaran-
teed hy suhsection (a). This continues in effect the provision of the
original Clayton Act and does not compel a seller to sell to any particular
customer at a particular price merely hecaase at the same time he is selling
the same product to another customer at that price.
Functional disccrunts are not affected "by the Act—this is home
out by a careful analysis of the law itself, its history and the influence
which led to its construction. It would he difficult to show competitive
injury where a price structure is based upon a broad and simple classifica-
tion among different types of customers in the channels of distribution.
The brokerage section of the Act, Subsection (c), prohibits, in
connection with an interstate sale, the payment or receipt of anything of
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation except for services
rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, either to the party, or to any intermediary acting for or subject
to the direct or indirect control of that party making the purchase. This
provision has its antecedents in the brokerage clauses which were included
with variations in many of the codes under N. R. A. and was a natural ev-
olution of the facts developed by the Federal Trade Commission investigation
of the chain stores. The aim of this clause is to prohibit the splitting of
brokerage and to eliminate payments made directly to buyers or to agents of
buyers, and to buyer-owned or controlled brokers.
(l) Zorn and Peldman, Business under the New Price Laws , 1937. Chapter X,
pp. 166-188.
Van Cise, "Functional Prices", Robins on-Patman Act Symposium , Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., January 22, IW. pp. 89-98.

Subsection (d) prohibits the granting of any allowances for any
services or facilities rendered by the buyer unless such payment Is avail-
able on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the
distribution of such products or commodities. This inclTides allowances for '
advertising, window and counter display, sales prcnnotional work, and all
other forms of allowances in connection with the processing, handling, or
sale of a commodity*
Section 2 of the Act relates only to procedure that was pending
"before the Federal Trade Commission at the time of the passage of the Act.
It merely continued the rights of action legation and orders of the FTC
that were based on former Section 2 of the Clayton Act. Such matter was
not affected by the new law, but if the Commission had reason to believe that
provisions of the Robins on-Patman Act were being violated, the PTC wa^
empowered to reopen any proceeding in which a cease and desist order had been
entered prior to the effective date of the new law.
Section 3 of tJie Act, the criminal provision, was introduced as
'
a separate bill in the Senate and was subsequently added without change as
a floor amendment to the Robinson Bill,
Perhaps more than any other anti-trust law, the application of
the Robins on-Patman Act to particular situations is completely dependent
upon the specific facts and circumstances involved. Accordingly, questions
as to the lawfulness of selling methods of individual manufacturers or dis-
tributors can be determined only in the light of complete knowledge of
their particular prices, customers, discounts, allowances and other sales
practices. Therefore, any decision as to the legitimaxjy of a particular
selling method must be limited to the relationship among the sales involved
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and would not necessarily apply to any other sales "by the same manufactur-
er, and could not apply to the selling practices of a different manufac-
turer or distributor. The results of each case in one industry may "be
applied to the methods and practices used "by all industries for, while the
specific facts may he different, the principles established are common to
all businesses.
3. Immediate Reactions
The reaction produced in the six months following the passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act was sheer tumult, fear and condemnation. But by
September, 1936, the law was regarded as of little significance and busi-
ness would carry on as usual.
Immediately following President Roosevelt's signature, on June 19*
1936, analyses and interpretations poured forth from trade associations
warning and suggesting to their members to review in detail their merchan-
dising and customer policies, to re-examine their quantity discount sched-
ules, to stick to published list prices and to overhaul and revise account-
ing methods to determine what was the most economical size of order. Pre-
dictions were made which proclaimed that the Act would not only create new
methods of doing business but would bring under federal surveillance every
commercial transaction from the point of original raw material production
through to the final retail sale of the finished product.
Some prophesied that there would be greater customer selection,
siBtpler customer classifications and price structures. Special customer
classifications that were created for the purpose of making special
(1) "Shakeup in Selling Practices", Business Week , No. 355, June 20, 1936,
pp. 13-15.

concessions would survive only to the degree that they could "be Justified "by
demonstrahle cost differences. There would he more quantity brackets to
prevent the Ju]i5)S between brackets from being so big and vulnerable. Price
structures would be simplified because of the elimination of many customer
classifications resting purely on discriminatory bases. The small buyer
would probably suffer for, by focusing attention on the costs and economies
arising from the size of orders, the principle that small transaxstions are
costly would be brought home to manufacturers and wholesalers.
Others maintained that existing spreads between prices for
different quantities would be somewhat diminished as manufacturers and
wholesalers examined their quantity discount schedules and tightened them
to agree with costs and conform to the law.
It was predicted that advertising by retailers would be reduced
because of the possibility of cancellation of promotional allowances by
manttfacturers . Because of such possible cancellation some claimed that
private brands would be used more than national brands.
Others believed that the functions of cooperative and voliantaries
would be more closely examined to see which of them was really entitled to
the considerations permitted by the Act. It was believed that the brokerage
fees paid to many cooperative buying groups would be eliminated and hence
reduce the price advantages they held.
As a result of the possible cancellation of advertising allowances
and brokerage fees by manufacturers, packers and processors, many predicted
that the price of food to consumers would rise. Since the ability of chains
(l) Thorp, "Possible Effects of the Robins on-Patman Act on Business Practices"
Pun & Bradstreet Monthly Review
.
Vol. i}4, No. 2100, July, 1936, pp. 2-7.
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and cooperatives to undersell competitors stemmed in large part from these
concessions, prices would rise once these advantages were wiped out.
It was pointed out by many that chains and other large "buyers
would "be forced into manufacturing their own requirements and thus put
the small purchaser in a worse position than before.
The quick acting Associated Grocery Manufacturers of Americat
composed of many of the larger food manufacturers and packers, advised
their members to pursue the following course!
"1. Cso'efully study qtiantity discounts and be prepared
to Justify them by actual savings, cancelling those
which cannot be justified as of June 19."
"2. Cancel, as of June 19 » all arrangements for paying
brokerage to buyers."
"3. Cancel or suspend all questionable advertising and
service payment arrangements pending a further
study of the law to learn what is legally permis-
sible." (3)
On the other extreme were a group of companies who continued to
do business as usual, making no changes in their specific practices until
they received official word from the PTC and the courts.
The middle stand was taken by the majority of firms in the food
industry. Although this group continued to operate as before, all deals
were carefully scrutinized; those which could be justified as fair and
not discriminatory were continued while borderline cases were adjusted to
(1) "Light in Patman Law Darkness", Business Week, No, 36O, July 25. 1936,
pp. 1^4-15.
(2) Thorp & George, "Check List of Possible Effects of the Robins on-Patman
Act", Dun & Bradstreet Monthly Review , Vol. l^'k. No. 2101, August, 1936,
pp. 2-17 .
~
(3) "Patman Excitement Calming", Pacts in Pood Distribution , American
Institute of Pood Distribution, Inc., July 25. 1936, p. 2.
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conform to the provisions of the Act. Many in this grcnxp believed that the
Act woald not be as revolutionary as was predicted but that it merely gave
industry the opporttmity of making a new start along sounder, fairer and
more constructive lines.
In the brokerage field many different approaches were taken. The
voluntaries and cooperatives asserted that they performed specific services
for sellers, such as assured cooperation of retail outlets and successful
promotion and sale of products, and they were entitled to brokerage payments.
The Atlantic Commission Company and the Wesco Pood Coinpany, affiliates of
A. & P. and Kroger respectively, devised plans whereby the brokerage which
they formerly had received would not appear on the invoice as brokerage but
would be reflected in the net price. Other arrangements were made with manu-
facturers whereby all brokerage that would have been paid but for the Act
would be paid at a later date once the brokerage section of the Act was
clarified or if the Act was declared -unconstitutional.
The e:5)erience of being left high and dry by the abrupt cancella^-
tion of advertising allowances caused distributors to use advertising space,
that was formerly contractually devoted to national brands, to promote the
most profitable items they carried, chief among which were their private
brands. The following statement by an Eastern distributor in mid-August
of 1936 shows the STiccess of this move:
"We have stopped advertising the brands of manufacturers
who no longer pay us allowances under the Eobins on-Patman
Act. We are doing Just as much advertising but are putting
our efforts more into canned and glass goods and private
label merchandise, all of which are profitable items.
(1) Executive Service in Food Distribution . American Institute of Pood
Distribution, July 1, 1936, p. 7.

Formerly, we were anxious to advertise these but did
not have the space because of the large number of
staples which we had to advertise each week tuider
contract. We are quite pleased now because we are
noticing an increase in business on these more
profitable items and believe that the extra profit
which we, ourselves, are getting should more than
counteract any advertising money which we might lose." (l)
Manufacturers belittled the ultimate success of distributors'
increased use of private brands. Since development of consumer acceptance
of little known brands is a long term proposition, manufacturers were con-
fidant that they would be able to foresee the menace of private brand com*
petition and could take appropriate steps to combat it. A cut in price to
coii5)ete with private brands would, in their opinion, suffice to level any
such threat.
By September of 1936, the leaders in the food industry, A. & P.,
Safeway, Standard Brands and Hershey Chocolate Company, taking their cue
from the results of a conference on the Robins on-Patman Act held between
members of the food industry and representatives of the J T C on August 16,
1936, started the trend toward resumption of promotional programs and the
rest of the trade followed suit. The big fellows, who were watched by
their smaller competitors as closely as a goldfish in a bowl, set the pat-
tern and the food industry then swung towards business as usual. (3)
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Con^jany decided it could legally
resume its demands for advertising allowaaces and quantity discounts. The/
contracts sent out by A. & P. to its st^jpliers called for A. & P. "to render
(1) Executive Service in Food Distribution , American Institute of Pood
Distribution, August 22, 1936, p. 8,
(2) Ibid., September 12, 1936, p. 5.
(3) This conference is discussed in detail in Chapter III.
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certain special advertising and special distribution" services in return
for an advertising allowance of 6%. The qxiantity discount contracts
sought 5/^ off list price and obligated A. & P
"to "buy from the manufacturer a large quantity of
merchandise and, in view of the purchase in large
quantity, present and prospective, the manufacturer
agrees to stllow the following discount " (2)
Both types of contracts carried this significant paragraph:
"The manufacturer avows his willingness to make the
same agreement as is here made with any other pur-
chaser similarly situated and on proportionally equal
terms." (3)
Hence A. & P. stqpposedly protected itself hy passing the "buck along to the
seller who guaranteed that the discount and advertising allowances granted
were not violations of the Rohins on-Patman Act.
Initial Results
By the end of 1936, opinion of the Act had crystallized and certain
effects were apparent. Separate contracts for promotional allowances were
adopted and allowances were granted on a more justifiable basis. Those
manufacturers who were getting value received from their promotional pay-
ments were eager to reestablish these payments while those whose allowances
were nothing but discounts to favorite customers were pleased over having
the Act serve as excuse for their elimination.
The trend toward private brands which existed before the Robinson-
Patman Act probably was accelerated by the Act as distributors reexamined
their advertising and began featuring fewer and more profitable items.
(1) "Forcing Price Law Issue", Business Week, No. 366, September 5t 1936, p. 13*
(2) Ibid., p. 13
(3) Ibid., p. Ik

Although food prices rose in the latter half of 1936, little or
no effect could be attributed to the Act. General increase in business
activity and the summer drought of 1936 were the major factors.
Chains and other large buyers sought to hold any advantages they
had received prior to the passage of the Law to the degree they were justi-
fiable. Sellers used the law to put their deals in order and to get out
from under carelessly drawn promotional programs.
A survey conducted by the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of
America among 5^0 manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers to discover the
immediate effects of the Robins on-Patman Act showed the following:
"Nineteen per cent of manufacturers paid brokerage direct
prior to the Act; none do now. Thirty-seven per cent paid
brokerage through group buyer's headquarters; l6/i continue
to do."
"When the Law was first enacted, virtually all manufacturers
suspended advertising allowances. Thirty-five per cent
continue the suspension, apparently in the expectation of
making some restitution later; 18^ have definitely dis-
continued; ^0^ have restored them with sig-nificant changes."
"Pifty per cent of manufacturers and 57/^ of distributors
favor advertising allowances regardless of the Law, though
70$^ of manufacturers and 67/^ of distributors record them-
selves as favoring such allowances when paid for services
rendered as required by the Robins on-Patman Law."
"Sixty-seven per cent of the manufacturers have made no
change in their quantity discount schedules, despite all
the agitation. With regard to cumulative discounts for
purchases over a specified period, 23 of manufacturers
used them prior to June 19 and 9.^/^ use them now—almost
35/^ of the distributors still want them."
"More than 70^ of the entire trade approve the intent of
the Law as they interpret it and this with significant
reservations and aualifications. Only kO^ admit any
I benefits from the Act, though 15/^ have hopes of still
receiving some." (l)
(l) George, "Business Adjusts Itself to Robinson-Patman Act", ]>un and
Bradstreet Monthly Review
,
Vol.45, No.2108, March 1937, PP. 11-15.

CHAPTER III
Administration
A. Clarification of the Act
Congress laid dovm certain rules and principles when it passed
the Rollins on-Patman Act, "but the application of these rales to practical
husiness methods was the J oh of the Federal Trade Commission. It was to
the Commission, the administrative and enforcement agency, that "business
looked for clarification and interpretation of the Act. However, the PTC
itself was finding difficulty in interpreting the Act. As an administra-
tive agency, it could not lay down hard and fast rules ahout enforcement
since each case arising under the Act would have to he judged on its own
peculiar circumstances and would he subject to court review.
Nevertheless, on August 16, 1936, a contingent of food manufac-
turers, processors and distributors met with members of the legal staff
of the P T C in an effort to clear up some of the fears and misunder-
standings that had arisen in the food industry because of the Act. Expres-
sions and opinions were not the official verdict of the government agency,
but rather indications of what the PTC was likely to think about when it
took up the application of the law.
The food group was led by Grilbert H. Montague, general counsel
of the National Pood & Grocery Conference Committee and Paul Willis,
President of the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America. Other or-
ganizations represented were the National Voluntary/ Groups Institute, the
National Association of Retail Grocers, the National Pederation of Whole-
sale Grocers, Pood & Chain Stores of America and the National Retailer
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Owned Wholesale G-roceries.
The following points were made at the conference:
1. The Act would "be enforced with a genuine rule of reason and
each case would "be considered on the "basis of the individual facts presented.
It was recognized hy the conference that there could not "be an exact standard
of costs established which could Tse supplied as a yardstick to every deal
consummated in the industry since no two accountants were able to study the
same set of hooks and arrive at exactly the same figure of costs for selling
the same article.
2. Standard dictionary definitions of terms would suffice, it
was decided, and the FTC would not look for hidden meanings in the Act
"but wduld he guided by the Intent of Congress. For example, a customer
could only be the customer of one man; if a retailer bought Maxwell House
Coffee from his wholesaler, he could not be said to be a customer of General
Foods
.
3. The Robins on-Patman Act would not be regarded as a legislative
franchise to remodel business—the Commission would not look for trouble and
would not use the Act in a campaign to remodel business.
4. It was agreed that not all price discriminations would be un-
lawful, but all companies, especially those selling to large distributors,
would have to be able to justify their discounts on a strict accounting
basis in terms of savings in the cost of manufacture, sale or distribution.
In all questions concerning the validity of quantity discounts, it was stated
that the Commission would insist that a contract with a big customer should
carrj'^ its full share of the seller's whole overhead. The accepted practice
of allowing cash discounts would not be interfered with provided that such

cash discounts "be in line with the costs of extending credit.
5. The food men were told the practice of splitting "brokerages
and rebating brokerages would be definitely forbidden by the Act. However,
nothing would prevent a manufacturer from giving a big customer virt\ially
the full "brokerage as a discount if this price reduction could be justified
by the manufacturer's saving in handling such business direct. The bill,
it was stated, did not contain any provision prohibiting buyers from owning
stock in a "brokerage house; it merely said that if a so-called "brokerage
company was controlled "by the buyer, it would be unlawful for the seller
to compensate the "brokerage company. The Law, the FTC men pointed out,
proposed no interference with the ownership of stock "but it did prohibit
price discriminations whether given or obtained directly or "by su'bterfuge.
6. The FTC would not look upon wholesalers and retailers as
coB5)etitors, and, therefore, manufacturers would not "be required to deal
with "both on the same price "basis.
7. There would "be considerable latitude In interpreting the
phrase "proportionally equal terms", A recognition would be made of the
fact that some customers would "be a"ble to render services that others
could not, so that factors of quality of service as well as quantity of
allowance would enter into the picture. Flat advertising and promotional
allowances, such as those made to chain stores, would no longer be safe,
it was decided, for all advertising made through a retailer by a manu-
facturer would have to be placed on a true cost basis in accordance with
the Act.
8. The Commission would not interpret the phrase "available"
(Section (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act) to mean that the manufacttirer
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or processor would need to notify all customers of the fact that he had
advertising allowances at his disposal; rather, the phrase would be taken
to mean "obtainable" so there would be room in the interpretation of the
law to consider the relative merits of claims presented by various custom-
ers.
9. Contracts for future delivery would not be invalidated by
the Act, the conferees agreed, but all clauses in the agreement which
could be interpreted as causing discrimination would be subject to govern-
mental surveillance.
10. It was agreed that in establishing prices on private branded
goods supplied to a distributor, manufacturers and processors would be
allowed to deduct the cost of advertising their own brands, and justify
this discount as a saving in the cost of manufacture, sale or distribution,
11. Free deals, the use of demonstrators and push-money would be
subject to the requirement that all allowances and services be made avail-
able to all buyers on proportionally equal terms, the conferees decided.
As a result of this conference, the fears of the food industry
were somewhat allsiyed and it began to be felt that the trade would not fare
as badly as was thotight. It was agreed that answers to questions would
have to be gathered over a long period of time from the PTC complaints
and court cases and that many parts of the Act would still require clar-
ification. However, the food industry began to breathe more easily and
realized that the Robinson-Patman Act would not prove to be a harsh inter-
ference with normal business procedure.
(l) "Price Law Looks Less Drastic", Business Week , No. 36^, August 22, 1936.
pp. 13-15.
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B. Dutl»8 and Fonctlona of the Federal Trade Conmlselon
The Federal Trade Canmission, an administrative "body exercising
qxiasi-judicial functions was charged by Congress with the enforcement of
the Rohinson-Patman Act. The Commission was organized on March 16, 1915
under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 191^. It is caacpoBedi of five
commissioners appointed "by the President subject to Senate confirmation.
The term of office is seven years and the chairmanship rotates annually so
that each commissioner serves as chairman at least once during his term of
office. Not more than three of its membership may belong to the same polit-
ical party.
Up to 1936, the prestige of the FTC was at a low ebb since ap-
pointments were invariably political doles and the Commission never received
any real support from the administration in power. Its staff was consis-
tently robbed of its more capable men for other more important assignments.
Most business men regarded the Commission as another meddling government
bureaucratic body.
The duties of the FTC are twofold—enforcement of the laws it
administers and general investigations of economic conditions in interstate
and foreign commerce undertaken upon presidential order, congressional res-
olution or upon its own initiative. Laws which the Commission enforces are
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and its amendments, Sections 2, 3»
7 and 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914. the Export Trade Act (Webb-Pomerene Law)
of 1918, the Robins on-Patman Act of 1936, the Wool Products Labeling Act of
1939 and the Lanham Trade Mark Act of 1946.
(1) "How F T C Got That Way", Business Week . No. 37O, October 3» 1936, pp. 17-18.
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Sections 6 (a) and ("b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of
191^ clearly define the Commission's powers as follows:
"(a) To gather and compile infoirmation concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the
organization, business, condtict, practices
and management of smy corporation engaged in
commerce, excepting banks and common carriers
and its relation to other corporations
and to individuals, associations and partner-
ships .
"
•'(b) To require, by general or special orders,
corporations engaged in commerce, excepting
banks and common carriers to file with
the Commission in such form as the Commission
may prescribe, annual or special, or both
annual and special, reports or answers in
writing to specific questions, furnishing to
the Commission such information as it may
require as to the organization, business,
conduct, practices, management and relation
to other corporations, partnerships and
individuals of the respective corporations
filing such reports or answers in writing "
When a complaint, stjpported by evidence of price discrimination
and meeting the essential jurisdictional elements of the Robins on-Patman
Act, is received by the PTC, it is docketed. An investigation is then
initiated by a staff attorney appointed by the Commission's Chief ISxaminer
to determine the facts in the case. A record of the case is drawn up with
recommendations as to what action should be taken and is submitted to the
Chief Examiner who reviews the case and recommends to the Commission that,
(l) the case be closed without further action because of lack of evidence
to support the charges or that the coinplained of practice was not a vio-
lation of the Act, (2) the case be closed upon the signing by the respon-
dent of a stipulation of the facts and an agreement to cease and desist
from the unlawful practices as charged, or (3) a formal complaint be issued.
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Any company wishing to plead guilty to the complaint may "be
given the opportiinity, at the discretion of the Commission, "by signing
a stipulation in which the respondent not only promises and agrees to
cease and disist from the discriminatory practices "but also agrees that
the admitted facts may he used against him if thereafter the FTC has
reason to believe that he is violating the agreement to cease and desist.
Generally a stipulation is used when the violation occurs throxiigh ignorance
or misunderstanding of the law and when the practice will cease once called
to the attention of the offender. This method of case disposition becomes
part of the public records of the Commission, but all proceedings prior
to publication are confidential as is the identity of the complainant.
If, however, a company decides to contest the charge or if the
Commission issues a complaint, a public hearing is conducted before a
Trial Examiner appointed by the Commission. At this hearing the FTC
may use data taken from the respondent con5)any's own private files to
prove the charge. Thus, all of the details of a business may become
public property. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission either
dismisses the complaint or issues a cease and desist order which can only
be appealed to a United States Court of Appeals.
The possibility of an F T C case disclosing the details of a
company's operations and methods has been one of the most influential
factors forcing voluntary compliance with the Act. Furthermore, the
danger of losing the good-will of customers through disclosure that all
were not treated with equal favor has been a deterrent in aiding companies
(l) See any Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for a detailed
account of its procedure and organization.

to turn down all deals which they would not he willing to explain in
detail to all customers and competitors. Again the possibility
of triple damage action and financial loss has initiated self-regula-
tion. Jinally, the criminal provision of the Act, enforceable by the
Department of Justice, makes a violator of the Act liable to a fine of
$5,000, imprisonment for one year, or both.
The Commission's policy has been to develop only those cases
which will lead to a clarification of the Act involved and which will
settle controversial points arising out of the wording of the Act.
The FTC has found that investigations of alleged violations
of the Robinson-Patman Act have been more expensive and time-consuming
than those made \2nder any other acts administered by the Commission. The
technical nature of the Act, the detail required to determine its appli-
cation and the elaborate cost accounting studies needed to prove price
differentials account for this high ratio of time and money. Nevertheless
the Commission has endeavored in view of limited funds and personnel, to
confine investigations to matters of substantial iisportance and to elimin-
ate time and money e:5)enditures investigating cases where preliminary
inquiry discloses them to possess little practical importance.
(l) Robins on-Patman Guide Book , American Institute of Food Distribution,
19^0, p. 5.
\
CHAPTER 17
I. Enforcement
A. Brokerage
No other provision of the Robins on-Patman Act has received as
much attention or has been as thoroughly tested by judicial review as
Section 2 (c), the brokerage provision of the law. Underlying the
provision, as administered by the FTC, is the concept of the true
merchandise broker. He is defined as an independent intermediary who
either furnishes bona fide services to the seller in finding market out-
lets or represents the buyer in seeking sources of supply and that he
retains the fee paid for such services. His primary function is to
bring about a purchase and sale for which he is compensated in the form
of a brokerage fee received from one party only; thus his fiduciary obli-
gation rons to the principal in whose behalf he acts. Further inter-
pretation by the PTC, sustained by the courts, precludes the buyer or
his agent from claiming rendition of services to the seller in connection
with his own purchases. (2)
The first enforcement action taken by the Commission was on
January I3. 1937 1 when separate complaints against the Biddle Purchasing
Company and the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company were issued. Each
case was reviewed by the courts and each became the prototype of one of
the two basic groups of later PTC proceedings—those in which an inter-
mediary acted between btiyer and seller and those in which the seller dealt
(1) Article III, Section 1, Constitution of the National Food Brokers
Association.
(2) Oppenheim, "Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinsoni*
Patman Act", George Washington Law Review , Vol. 8, No. 3, January-
February, 1940, p. 512.

directly with the "btiyer.
The Biddle Purchasing Company operated a combined marketing
information and purchasing service for 2400 wholesale food dealers who
subscribed to the service, paying $25.00 to $50.00 per month under written
contracts. Dealers forwarded orders to the company's "buying staff who,
in turn placed orders with sellers. Goods were delivered and hilled
direct to each dealer and brokerage fees were paid direct to the Biddle
Cranpany which, in turn, credited this brokerage to each dealer. About
865^ of the buyers paid more in subscription fees than was due them in
brokerage credits.
The purchasing company claimed it was a true intermediary
which could ax;cept compensation from both b\iyer and seller since both
knew of the company's method of operation. The company further claimed
that It rendered services to sellers by saving them the expense of dealing
with each buyer separately. The Commission concluded that, irrespective
of the buyers' and sellers' knowledge, Biddle was the agent of the buyers,
acted solely for the buyers and, as such, could not receive fees from sellers.
The PTC pointed out that those services which the purchasing company
claimed it furnished sellers were incidental to its main function and
constituted a necessary part of Biddle 's services to its subscribers.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the Commission's ruling
and found that since Biddle passed its brokerage back to its subscribers,
it was compensated solely by buyers and therefore, was the agent of buyers
and subject to their control. Since the United States Stipreme Court re-
fused to grant a writ of Certiorari in this case, the decision stands as
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final on this type of "brokerage payment.
Before the Circuit Court of Appeals, Biddle urged that Section
2 (c) of the Act was unconstitutional unless the provisions of Section
2 (a) with respect to limitation of competition or tendency to create a
monopoly applied also. This argument was rejected by the court which
eiffirmed the contitutionality of the subsection, holding that Section
2 (c) was wholly independent of Section 2 (a) and that consideration of
any effect upon competition was immaterial. Congress, the court stated,
intended to prohibit the transmission of brokerage from seller to buyer
as an unfair trade practice and thus there was no necessity of proving
specific injury to competition as would have to be done in every case
under Section 2 (a) of the Act. The court, by implication, upheld the
entire Act as constitutional, for, if it was held that prohibition of
price discrimination via the medium of brokerage payments is constitu-
tional, it inevitably follows that prohibition of direct price discrim-
(2)ination is certainly valid. ^ '
The PTC has consistently held the view, which has been sus-
tained without exception by the courts, that an intermediary acting for,
or controlled by a buyer, could never render services to a seller.
Cooperative associations were not exempt from the prohibitions
of the brokerage section of the Act for the court found in the Quality
Bakers Case that neither collective ownership by a large group of boiyers,
where no buyer could be said to be in control, nor the failure to
(1) Biddle Purchasing Co., et al vs. PTC (CCA-2, 1938) 96 Fed. (2d) 687,
affirming Docket 3032~Januar3' 13, 1937, cert, denied 305 U. S. 634.
(2) Research Institute of America, Inc., Business Control Coordinator ,
Vol. 1, 1944, pp. 10, 393.
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distri'bute all "brokerage received changed the application of Section 2
(c). In the We"bb-Crawford Case the admitted rendering of normal
"brokerage services by a partnership was held illegal because the partners
owned a b-uying coaspany and served as its officers. In the Modern
Marketing Case the courts decided that a contract arrangement licensing
the rights to sell a particular brand of food products and the distribu-
tion of the license fees to the buyers was a violation of the brokerage
section of the Act.
Any connection between brokers and buyers has been closely
scrutinized by the P T C in its interpretation of the phrase "except for
services rendered". The Commission has maintained, with sustaining opin-
ions by the courts in every instance, that this phrase does not permit
payment of brokerage by sellers* agents to buyers' agents or buyers'
controlled intermediaries whether the control arises by contract, by
stock ownership, by common officers or interlocking directorships, or
by any other means, whereby the buyer has the ultimate legal power to
control the distribution of the brokerage. Any arrangement wherein
brokerage is transmitted by an intermediary to the buyers is deemed a
violation of the brokerage section of the Act.
The second basic group of cases arising under Section 2 (c),
those in which the seller dealt directly with the buyer, has been largely
(1) Quality Bakers of America, et al v. F T C (CCA-1, 1940), 114 Fed. (2d)
393, affirming Docket 3218—Agust 26, 1937-
(2) Webb-Crawford Co., et al v. F T C (CCA-5. 1940), 109 Fed. (2d) 268,
affirming Docket 32 1^^—^August 26, 1937.
(3) Modern Marketing Service Inc., et al v. F T C (CCA-7, 1945), 149 Fed.
(2d) 970, affirming Docket 3783—May 6, 1939.
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concerned with the granting of a net price, allowance or discount in lieu
of brokerage.
In its case against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company,
the FTC charged A. & P. with making purchases at net prices and with
receiving discounts and allowances which reflected brokerage that would
have been paid by sellers to brokers. The Atlantic & Pacific con-
tended that the cost differential provisions of Section 2 (a) must be
read with Section 2 (c); and, since the net price reflected a saving in
cost to the seller equivalent to the brokerage which he would otherwise
have to pay, this saving could be passed along to the direct buyer. The
court confirmed the Commission's view that Section 2 (c) was con^lete
and independent and dealt specifically with a particular trade practice
deemed by Congress as an unfair method of competition. It was held that
brokerage could not be passed on to buyers as a saving in cost whether
it be paid directly or in the form of a net price or allowance.
In 19^1-^2 the Commission issued a number of complaints against
wholesalers who served as brokers in selling to small distributors and as
wholesalers in selling to retailers. In such transactions, it was the
practice to allow the buying broker a commission on his direct purchases
as well as on his regular brokerage operations. The Southgate Brokerage
Coinpany made all its purchases direct from sellers, keeping 60^ for its
own account and selling the rest to small distributors. In pro-
hibiting the payment of brokerage on purchases Southgate made for its
(1) Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. P T C (CCA-3. 1939) 106 Ped. (2d)
667, affirming Docket 3031~JanTiary 3, 1937, cert, denied 3O8 U. S. 625-
(2) Southgate Brokerage Co., Inc. v. P T C, (CCA-2, 19^5), 105 Ted. (2d)
607, affirming Docket i^821—August 5. 19^2.

own account, the PTC and the courts maintained that lack of discrim-
inatory effect among huyers was irrelevant due to the independence of
subsection (c) and that, on no account, could a "buyer render service to
a seller or "be paid by a seller.
The most recent case attracting nation-wide attention, involving
practices expressly prohibited by subsection (c), was the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act suit against the A. & P. The court found that the Company
wrung price concessions from manufacturers and packers while the Atlantic
Commission Company, a wholly owned subsidiarj'^ of A. & P., acted as sel-
ling agent for the manufacturers involved, that the Atlantic Commission
Company sponsored cooperative associations of producers and growers
dominated by A. & P. personnel, and that the commission company acted
as a buyers' broker, a sellers' broker and a direct b-c^er for A. & P.,
all at the same time. By reason of these and other practices the court
found the company guilty of violating the Sherman Act.
After twelve years of enforcement, the P T C's interpretation
of Section 2(c) is clear. The phrase, "except for services rendered",
indicates that if there be compensation to an agent, it must be for bona
fide brokerage. A seller or buyer may compensate a broker for services
rendered but an agent cannot serve two masters.
It may be taken as settled that the brokerage of the Act un-
conditionally prohibits:
1. The payment or allowance of brokerage to buyers on their
purchases either directly to them or through their agents.
(l) U. S. V. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., et al, (D. Ct. B.
111., 1946), 67 Ped. Supp. 626.

^5
2. The payment of "brokerage to intermediaries who act for buyers
and are controlled, however indirectly, "by bijyers even though some type of
service is rendered to sellers.
3. The application of the "services rendered" phrase to "buyers,
their agents or controlled intermediaries and in no way does it allow a
condition where brokerage may be paid in any form to them.
4. The reflection of brokerage by a seller, who ordinarily
uses brokers, to a direct "buyer in the form of a net price, an allowance
or discount.
5. The payment of brokerage to a buying broker on those pur-
chases made for his own account.
6. The application of the cost differential and competitive
effect provision of Section 2 (a) of the Act to Section 2 (c).
7. The application of the cooperative association exemption
proviso of Section 4 to Section 2 (c).
This conception of the brokerage provision of the Robinson-
Patman Act has immeasurably strengthened the position of the independent
food broker. It has forced the buying broker to decide whether he wants to
be exclusively a broker or a buyer. It has brought about the dissolution
of many long established marketing information and buying service c<Mnpanies.
It has also forced many manufacturers and processors of food to use brokers
exclusively or to sell direct so that they can justify price differentials
on the basis of cost. All price concessions granted via the medium of
brokerage payments that prevailed in the food industry prior to the enact-
ment of the law were declared illegal and thus placed the independent
wholesaler and retailer on firmer, more eqtiitable competitive ground.

B
. Price Discrimination
In the enforcement of the prohilJltlons of price discrimination
outlined by the Robinson-Patman Act, the Federal Trade Commission has
been concerned with price differentials that were contained in qtiantity
discount scales, cumulative or volume discount concessions and erroneous
functional discount classifications and differences disguised by private
brands and package sizes. In every case that price discrimination oc-
curred between two or more customers of a given seller, the Commission
had to show that the commodities involved were of like grade and q\iantity
and that there was competitive injury as a result of the practice employed.
Respondents could justify differentials based on differences in manufac-
turing or distribution costs, changing market conditions or competition.
Despite these conditions, the PTC issued 158 compladnts as of January,
IW.
The first three discrimination complaints instituted by the
PTC not only showed that cost justification and the meeting of an
equally low price of coinpetitors would receive favorable consideration,
but also indicated that, in interpreting the requirement of injury to a
can5)etitor, the Commission would allow considerable latitoxde in the framing
of business price policies.
However, many con^laints have disclosed illegal discriminatory
practices and the Commission has issued cease and desist orders affecting
many Industries. In the Hollywood Hat Company Case, the PTC found that
(l) "The Effect of the Robins on-Patman Act on the Work of the PTC: The
Control of Price Discrimination", Harvard Law Review , Vol. No. ^,
February
, 19^1. pp. 67^5.
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the company sold hats to its largest customers at prices from $3.00 to
$6.00 a dozen lower than it sold to its "ordinary" customers; both types
of customers were competitors. The company was ordered to cease
and desist from this practice when the differentials could not be ac-
counted for by differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery.
Discrimination was charged against Standard Brands because of unjustified
(2)differentials in its quantity discount sale of bakers' yeast. ^ ' The
company contested the Commission's cease and desist order claiming that
differences in price were justified by cost savings but the PTC re-
affirmed its order and pointed out that Standard Brands' cost defense
was inadequate to Justify price dissimilarities. This case brought to
the fore the accounting problems introduced by the Law and its emphasis
on distribution cost accounting.
Price discrimination by manufacturers in favor of large buyers
was repeatedly exposed by the Commission. A manufacturer of mayonnaise
and food extracts was ordered to cease granting to certain chain stores
and to wholesalers associated under a common nane preferential discounts
not given to other customers and not Justified by savings in costs.
A candy manufacturer was ordered to cease making sales to large chain
purchasers at prices different from those charged other customers, the
differences not being in accord with differences in cost of manufacturing,
selling or delivery. Price discrimination in quantity discount scales
was also found to exist in the sales of a packaged bakery products manufac-
(1) Hollywood Hat Co., Inc., Docket 3020—December 23, 1936.
(2) Standard Brands Co., Docket 2986—November 21, 1936.
(3) C. P. Sauer Co., Docket 3646—November 11, 1938.
(4) Life Savers Corp., Docket 4057—A\:igust 8. 1941.
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tiirer in favor of large "buyers.
The 80-caJ.led ciamulative discount is one in which a customer is
given an allowance on the basis of his total purchases made during a
specific period of time, or is granted a percentage rebate of his purchases
in the event of purchasing a certain volume in a given period irrespective
of the number of orders given during the period. The mere fact that
a buyer has purchased a large quantity of goods in numerous small transac-
tions, the PTC stated, does not prove a saving to the seller which can
be legally passed to buyers by way of lower prices. In the Anheuser-Busch
case the company was charged with discrimination by selling bakers' yeast
to its customers on the basis of total consumption irrespective of the
number of individual deliveries made. By this method of granting discounts
an independent, located in the same area as one plant of a large chain
bakery, might have received the same quantity of yeast as the branch plant
but was obliged to pay more for the yeast.
In the Brill Company case, the company allowed certain chain
stores rebates amounting to approximately 2*/^ of the chains' annual
purchases of the product. The PTC pointed out that most food chains
operated on a marginal profit of 1§ to 2/^ and a rebate of actually
represented in many cases the difference between profit and loss. Moreover,
in sales to chains, the seller regarded each warehouse as an individual
customer, both as to sales effort and shipment of merchandise, so there
(1) National Biscuit Co., Docket 5013~July 20, 1943-
(2) Ostlund, "The Robins on-Patman Act and Quantity Discounts", The Accounting
Review , Vol. 14, No. 4, Part I, December, 1939. p. 403
(3) Anlieuser-Busch Co., Docket 2987—November 21, 194?.
(4) H. C. Brill Co., Docket 3299~January 20, 1938.

could not "be any cost justification for the practice. Reliates, "bonuses
and discounts dependent upon quantities purchased in specific size ship-
ments within specific periods of time were considered unlawful discrimi-
nation in the Curtiss Candy Company case. The use of so-called
"split TDusiness" discount hy salt companies was ordered to cease when
it was found that discounts were "based on total requirements of a
customer and not on the actual quantity purchased from any one source. ^2
Discounts resulting in competitive injury that arose from er-
roneous fixnctional or trade classification of huyers was another manifes-
tation of unlawful discrimination. The Rohinson-Patman Act makes it
necessary for a seller to he aware of to whom his customers resell in
order that the functional discounts he grants do not result in injury to
competition. In the case involving four manufacturers of fertilizer the
PTC found that there were few jobbers in the industry that sold exclu-
sively to dealers and that distributors, called jobbers, sold both to
users and to dealers. ^3) An P T C order required manxifacturers to
cease and desist from selling combination dealer-jobbers at jobbers'
prices, except as to that portion which was resold to dealers, and to
charge dealers' prices for that portion sold at retail. In a series of
cases involving five cigarette companies and later, a candy conipany, the
PTC ordered the respondents to cease and desist granting a discount to
vending machine operators while refusing similar discounts to competing
(1) Curtiss Candy Co., Docket 4673—Jantiary 21, 1942.
(2) International Salt Co., et al. Docket 43O7—September 9. 1940.
(3) Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., Hansen Inoculator Co., Urbana
Laboratories, Inc., and Nitrogen Co., Inc., Docket 3263, 3264, 3265,
and 3266 respectively—November I3, 1937.

50.
retail distributors.
Complaints charging discrimination because of sales made to
"buyers at prices not in accord with sound discount schedules have also
been issued by the FTC. A packer of fruits and vegetables was ordered
to discontinue price discrimination via the medium of three different
(2)price lists. ^ The lists, based on true cost savings, established
prices which varied with quantities purchased. But it was found that
the packing company sold to some purchasers at prices set by one list
when the purchaser did not buy in sufficient quantities to qualify for
that particular list.
When buyers are unwarrantably charged different prices for
identical goods with no atteinpt to disguise the differential, a simple case
of illegal discrimination can be demonstrated. But the PTC has brought
to light a few rather ingenious methods of obscuring price dissimilarities.
One of these devices is the sale of goods of the same grade and quality
(3)
under different brand names at varying prices. Another method was
disclosed when a company, selling com syn?), instituted several types
and sizes of containers, the use of which so affected the cost of manu-
(U)
facturing candy, that competition was substantially lessened.
In all the complaints investigated, the Federal Trade Commission
has declared that a price dissimilarity is not valid or invalid in itself.
(1) P. Lorillard Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., and Larus & Brother, Inc., Docket 3912, 3913, 391^ and
3915. respectively—November 5» 1939.
Philip Morris & Co., Ltd., Docket 3919—November 7. 1939.
Walter H. Johnson Candy Co., Docket 4677—January 22, 19^2
(2) Curtice Bros. Co., Docket 338I—April 23, 1938
(3) Continental Baking Co., Docket 41^9—May 31, 19^0.
(4) American Maize-Products Co., Docket 38O5—June 1, 1939-
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In order for a discrimination to be unlawful, it must "be shown that,
because of an unwarranted price advantage given to one customer, another
customer was placed at a competitive disadvantage. If, however, there
was cost justification for the practice or if the price difference was
made in accoird with those circmstances provided by the Robins on-Patman
Act, the differential was deemed legal. Each case heard by the Commission
has been judged on its own peculiar merits after a thorough investigation
of all the circumstances involved.
The Act threw a spotlight on distribution cost accounting, a
branch of accounting that was the least developed and probably the most
difficult.
••Few, even of the large and important companies, have
yet worked out and installed cost accounting systems
which, for purposes of defense under the Robinson-
Patman Act, are sound and adequate in their conception
and at the same time suitable and practicable for the
everyday use of the individual business concern." (l)
Distribution cost accounting is a field where there is, as
yet, no established and indisputable technique or procedure as compared
with the field of production cost accounting» Inqtiiries made by the FTC
in 19^0 and 19^1 disclosed a striking lack of proper distribution data in
industry throughout the country, as shown by the following statement:
*It became evident early in the Commission's inquiry
into distribution cost accounting that there is a
dearth of good case material. This situation is
the result of the fact that tintil recently little
attention has been given to this branch of account-
ing. The methods that are in use are imdergoing
change. This evolution is due, in part,
to a greater social control, as expressed in recent
(l) Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report, June, 1938i P- 10«
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legislation, to comply with which additional
information is necessary" (l)
The Cominission has rejected as unsound a number of cost reports
advanced in defense of alleged price discriminations for the reason that
costs had not been properly developed. It has insisted that cost al-
locations must he based on actual escperience and on a reasonable, sound
and adequate basis. Consequently, the Robins on-Fatman Act has made business
men in the food distribution industry, and in all other industries as well,
look into the price labyrinth and develop better cost accounting methods
to find out what they are doing, if for no other reason than to be able
to justify any deal. The Act has brought home with decided emphasis to
business the realization that distribution costs are important so as to
be able to select those commodities, quantities, markets and channels of
distribution which will result in the largest net profit possible.
This report will not touch \ipon the multiple basing point system
since the Supreme Court's decision in the Cement Case has created an air
of confusion. Congress has told the P T C to maintain a "hands off* policy
pending a Congressional inquiry and necessary legislation. Suffice it to
say, that the Cement decision showed that the cement companies violated
Section 2 (b) of the Act by receiving more from some customers than from
others. Apparently this decision outlaws phantom freight, aJiy type of
basing point system— single or multiple—and zone delivered prices (lead
industry case now up before the Supreme Court). A seller may shrink his
mill net to meet the freight advantage of a competitor. But this is
(l) Federal Trade Commission, Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting
for Manufacturing and Wholesaling . House Document No. 287, 77th
Congress, June 23, 19^1 » p. 12.

applicable only to an Individual competitive sltxiatlon and apparently,
cannot be construed as legal if used as a regular pricing system "by a
whole industry or an individual. Irrespective of future Congressional
action, this particular decision does not possess as many ramifications
tjpon the food industry as it does upon the heavy, basic industries of
the nation.
C. Anoyances and Services
Still another favored medium for the granting of unlawful
discriminations was the practice of large buyers to demand, and their
sellers to grant, special allov;ances in payment for purported advertising
and sales-promotional services which the customers agreed to render the
seller. These allowances and services became unjust when they were not
rendered as agreed and paid for, or when, if rendered, the payment was
grossly in excess of the received value, or when an allowance or service
granted one customer gave him an unwarranted competitive advantage over
another customer who was not permitted to enter into a similar sales-
promotional agreement. The Act attacked these evils by prohibiting the
granting of such allowances and services except when made available to
or accorded all competing customers on "proportionally eaual terms". The
latter phrase was designed to preserve equal opportunity in the channels
of distribution by protecting the small dealer. This proviso made it
illegal to limit allowances and services to a few customers on the
ground that they alone could furnish the desired services and to refuse
them to competing customers who were able to furnish services of the same
relative value but in less quantity. The Act also condemned a promotional

agreement unless it was a true, rea8ona"ble and earned payment for a bona
fide service.
The first case to be settled by the PTC involved payments of
royalties by manufacturers of golf balls and their association to the
Professional Golfers Association for the privilege of using the letters
"P G A" on golf balls. The Golfers Association used the royalties
for advertising, promoting and creating consumer preference for golf
balls 80 marked and distributed by P G A retailers. The Commission held
that such payments constituted discrimination against those retailers
who did not sell that particular brand and as a result, placed these
retailers in an unfavorable competitive position. In another case, a
cajming company was charged with allowing certain grocery con^anies
varying amounts per case for advertising the canner's cranberry sauce
under private brand names and refusing any payments to other grocers
selling the respondent's sauce under different private brand names. (3)
In the Grabosky Brothers Case the con^any was ordered to cease and desist
allowing discounts to chain stores tander an agreement whereby the retail
units of the chains provided sales promotional display services for the
(4)
company. ^ Other customers who were in competition with the chains
were not accorded similar agreements on proportionally equal terms.
The Federal Trade Commission has pointed out that a manufacturer
or distributor can equally proportionallize the payments for sales promo-
(1) Dunn, •'Section 2 (d) and (e)", Robins on-Patman Act Symposium , Commerce
Clearing House Inc., Jairuary 23, 19^, pp. 55-73
•
(2) Golf Ball Manufacturers Association et al. Docket 3I6I—June 3O, I937.
(3) Cranberry Canners, Inc., Docket 4637—November Ik, 19kl,
(4) Grabosky Brothers, Inc., Docket 47^0—March 26, 1942.
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tional services between competing customers in either of two ways;
first, "by making the same payment for a similar service to every cus-
tomer willing to render the service, and second, through uniformly
measuring this payment hy a reasonable standard of the relative marketing
value of that service to him in each instance. One such standard could
"be the volume of sales of his product to "buyers—^payments as a percentage
of sales.
A complaint involving the use of advertising payments as a
subterfuge for price concessions was issued against the Miami Wholesale
Drug Corporation. The company and six individuals, operating under
the name of the "Miami Magazine", induced sellers to contract for ad-
vertisements to be inserted in the magazine with the understanding that
the advertising charges would be credited to purchases made at the drug
company. Since the magazine was operated as a subterfuge and had no
substantial advertising value, this method of obtaining price concessions
was ordered to cease.
Complaints involving the granting of free goods and other
gratuities by sellers have been investigated by the PTC. In the
Republic Yeast Corporation case, the Commission ordered the company to
cease delivering large quantities of yeast as additions to orders of
favored customers at no charge resulting in a 5/^ lower cost to the buyers
so favored. ^3) An order for the National Grain Yeast Corporation to
cease and desist from offering grat\iities, consisting of liquor, tobacco,
meals, money, entertainment and other personal gifts, to employees of
(1) Dunn, op. cit. p. 71'
(2) Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., et al. Docket 3377—April 11, 1938*
(3) Republic Yeast Corp., Docket 4367—October 3O, 1940
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baking companies was issued. In the Continental Baking Co. case,
the PTC ordered the con^jany to cease inserting, in the wrappers of
"bread, coupons redeemable in merchandise or cash for the face value by
(7)
the company to buyers. \<^f
The application of the phrase, "proportionally equal terms",
came to light in the PTC investigation of the use of demonstrators by
distributors of toilet goods and cosmetics. In the Elizabeth Arden
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals i5)held the Commission's findings
that the demonstration allowance was in reality a discount, which was
acttially based on volume of net annual purchases, and that every store,
regardless of its prestige, location, volume, and equipment was entitled
to receive the same percentage discount or, as an alternative, be si^)-"
plied with the services of a demonstrator for a period commensurate with
the value of the allowance to which it was entitled.
The Robins on-Patman Act does not prohibit the various sales-
promotional devices as such but it does set down certain conditions
which must be met if the particular type of allowance or service employed
is not to be deemed a discrimination in violation of the Act. These
conditions prohibit sellers from making available any sales-promotion
services unless they are trae, reasonable and earned payments for services
actually rendered, and unless they have been made available to all buyers
con5)eting in the distribution of such products on proportionally equal terms.
(1) National Grain Teast Corp., Docket 39O3—September 29. 1939.
(2) Continental Baking Co, . Docket iH49—May 3I, 19^0
(3) Carter, "Validity of the Demonstrator Practice Under Section 2 (d) and
(e), Robins on-Patman Act S^onposium , Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
Januarj^ 23, 19^6, p. 93.
ik) Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. P T C (CCA-2, 19^6) I56 Fed. (2d) I32, affirming
Docket 3133-May 15, 1937, cert, denied 6? SC 1189.

CHAPTER V
I. Industry Opinions
During Septem"ber, 19^8, questionnaires were mailed to 75^
organizations in the food industry to oTatain the opinion of those active-
ly engaged in the field regarding the Robins on-Patman Act and its effect
on the food industry. Although only a Z6.^^ response was received—con-
sidered "by many to represent an average return—the respondents clearly
Indicated the attitude of the food industry toward the Act.
Stratified random sainpling was undertaken since this method
tied in with the use of mail cues tionnsdres and the date avallahle concern-
ing one portion of the universe, viz., food retailers. The 1939 Census of
Business was used to establish the ratio of food retailers in each state
to the national total. This ratio, applied to the 5^0 CJaestionnaires
allotted to food retailers, then gave the ncunher of questionnaires to "be
sent to retailers in each state. Using these resultant figures as a base,
one-fifth and one-tenth as many questionnaires were allotted to whole-
salers and brokers respectively in each state. Qaestionnaires to be
forwarded to food manufacturers were based on the iarportance of food
majiufacturing in each state limited in number only by the total number
of brokers selected. With the addition of a few important food trade
associations, the total sample numbered 750* Within the numerical limi-
tations for each stage of the food distribution system in each state,
names and addresses were selected at random from the Thomas Wholesale
and Kindred Trade Register , kk-th Annual, 19^0, and the Thomas Register
of American Manufacturers , 37th Edition, 19^.
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The questionnaire was designed not only to elicit industry
opinions on the effects each importsoit section of the Robins on-Patman
Act had on the food industrjs "but also to prove or disprove the early
fears and ill omens predicted for the industrj'. Only seven multiple
choice type questions were included and it was possible for more than
one answer to he given to many questions. In addition, space was
provided for respondents to better express opinions not covered by the
few questions. The many comments made in this section by respondents
proved most enlightening—comments that could not possibly be elicited
by any tj-pe of formal questioning via mail.
QffSSTIOmiHE
BITECTS or THE RCBINSON-PATMAH ACT ON THE POOD IHDUSTRY
Please indicate by a check, the answer you personally believe to be correct.
1. Did the Robinson-Patman Act
Eliminate price discrimination abuses?
Drive price discrimination abuses under cover?
Concern itself with non-existent price abuses?
Introduce new price abuses not covered by the Act? If so,
please describe briefly
2. Concerning brokerage allowances, did the Robins on-Patman Act
Eliminate unfair allowances?
Curtail the use of tinfair allowances?
Have no effect on the use of unfair allowances?
_________
Give rise to new methods of securing unfair brokerage? If so,
please describe briefly
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3. Concerning quantity discounts, did the Robins on-Patman Act
Tighten functional discounts?
Reduce quantity discount spreads?
Simplify manufacturers' and wholesalers* price structures?
Simplify customer classification
Have no effect on them?
k. Concerning promotional allowances, did the Robinson-Patman Act
______
Place them on a true cost basis?
Cause strict accountability for performance of advertising
services?
______
Place them on "proportionally equal terms" to all customers?
Curtail their use?
Have no effect on them?
5> In stimulating the use of private brands, was the Robinson-Patman Act
A major influence?
A minor influence?
Of no influence whatsoever?
6. ViHiat effect do you think the Robinson^atman Act has had on the food
industry?
No effect.
Bad effect. If so, please describe briefly
Beneficial effect. If so please describe briefly.
7. Do you think that the Robinson-Patman Act should be changed?
No.
Yes. If so, in what way?
8. What favorable or unfavorable comments do you wish to make concerning
the entire Robinson-Patman Act, any of its sections or any of its
effects on the food industry? Any comment will be greatly
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appreciated]
ITame
Firm
Position
Over 30^ of the questionnaires mailed were returned "but, since
many did not answer the questions and only made some general remarks, the
returns used for analysis constituted a 26.^1'^ return. Almost three-
fourths (72.7^) of the trade associations responded, whereas only a
fourth of the retailers and manufacturers (24. 5/^ and 2k. 0^ respectively)
returned questionnaires. Geographically, the Pacific Coast states had
the greatest proportion of respondents (iv9y^ of the questionnaires mailed
were returned) whereas the Mountain States had the poorest return (8.7/^).
Both the New England and Middle Atlantic Regions showed returns ahove the
national average, k7.5i> bxi^l 29.1^ respectively.
Tahle 3
Mail Questionnaire Response by Business Tunction
Business
Punct i on
Returned
Mailed No.
Associations
Manufacturers
Brokers
Wholesalers
Retailers
750
11
50
60
114
8
11
20
33
126
72.7^
24.0
33.3
28.9
24.5
198
Total
Average 26.45^

Table k
Mall Questionnaire Response "by Regl ons
Returned
jxeRx on Mailed No. i
Pacific 53 26 i^9.0
New England 57 27
Middle Atlantic 182 53 29.1
West South Central 65 17 26.2
East North Central 136 29 21.3
South Atlantic 97 20 20.6
East South Central 53 10 18.9
West North Central 66 8 12.1
Mountain 2 8.7
Total 750 198 26.14
Approximately two-thirds (66.1^) of the responding firms felt
that the Robins on-Patman Act was a good law and had "benefited the food
Industry. Retailers were not quite as convinced that it was a beneficial
law as were other members of the industry, while all associations stated
that it was a good law. Little more than a third suggested that the law
be changed with retailers again being predominant in this group. A
frequent retailer-suggested amendment was to "remove manufacturers from
the field—force a company to stay in one field", while most retailer-
sponsored changes sxiggested "taking out Sections 2 (c), (d), (e) and (f)".
Wholesalers, who voiced dissatisfaction with the present law, suggested
that the law "should be changed to prohibit big fellows from selling
merchandise below cost to eliminate the small fellows" and should also
"prohibit manufacturers from allowing special discounts and allowances
on extremely large purchases that only big fellows can take advantage of".
Little more than half of the industry (56.3^) felt that the
(l) Regional breakdown of the U. S. based on identical divisions used by
Bureau of the Census.
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Act eliminated price discrimination abuses. Evidently, discriminatory
practices were still in effect either by being driven under cover
(22.5^ felt so) or by the rise of new abuses not covered by the Act.
Table No. 5
EFFECT OF SCBINSCaT-PATMAN ACT ON FOOD IKDUSTRY—INDUSTRY OPINICaf
No. of
Respondents No Effect Bad Effect
Beneficial
Effect Total
Retailers 58 29.9 51.7 100. 0$^
Wholesalers 25 4.0 Zk.Q 72.0 100.0
Brokers 13 7.7' 15.4 76.9 100.0
Manufacturers 11 0 9.9 90.1 100.0
Associations 8 0 0 100.0 100.0
Average 11.3^ 22.^^ 66. IJ^ 100.0^
Apparently the Act was successful in eliminating or curtailing
unfair brokerage allowances since three out of four felt either one to be
the case. Retailers, who would know less about and are least affected by
brokerage, were more emphatic than other members of the industry in stating
that the Act stopped or curtailed brokerage abuses. Many respondents were
quick to spot new methods of unfair brokerage developed under the Act;
most of these pointed to the methods used by the A. & P. as \ancovered in
the recent Sherman Act case. Other devices were ••selling direct to
large buyers at cheaper prices, eliminating brokers'*, "receipt of ad-
ditional fees in lieu of specialty work, expense accounts or advertising",
and according to a manufacturer "selling direct by many in tlie canning
industry—using no brokers".
(1) See Chapter IV, p. ^3 above.

Table No. 6
EPFECT OF RaBINSCH^ATMAJir ACT OS UNgAIR BRCKERAaE ALLCVTANCES
Whole- Manu- Assocla-
Retallere salers Brokers facturers tione Average
Eliminate 20. OJ^ 25- 7/^ 27.3/^ ^O.IJ^ 1^0. OJ^ 25-
Curtail 5^.1 51.^ 50.0 33*3 ^0.0 50,k
No Effect 7.0 2.9 0 I3.3 20.0 6.4
New Methods of
securing unfair
allowances 18.9 20.0 22.7 13.3
_0 18.0
Total 100. OjJ 100. OjS 100. Ojg 100. OJ^ 100. OJ^ 100.0^
When it came to quantity discounts, practically all respondents
felt that the Act made some marked effect upon tightening functional
discounts, reducing quantity spreads and simplifying price structures
and customer classification at manufacturer and wholesaler level. Al-
though each group in the food industry seemed to place emphasis on a
different effect, nowhere else in the questionnaire was there stach unan-
imous opinion as to the effects of the Act.
Tahle No. 7
EFFECTS OF T^ RCBINSON-PATMAN ACT QUANTITY DISCODNTS
Whole- Manu^ Associa-
Retailers salers Brokers facturers tions Average
Reduce quantity
spreads 73.2j^ 51. 5/^ 70.0jg 72.75^ 50.0$^ 66. 8J^
Simplify mfgr*'
and wholesalers'
price structures 51.1 70.0 75.0 54.5 100.0 61.0
Simplify customer
classification 52.5 48.5 55.0 36.3 25.0 49.4
Tighten function-
al discounts 30.2 63.6 65.0 72.7 75.0 47.4
Ho effect 18.
3
17.1 10.0 36.3 37.5 18.8
Totals - do not add to lOOJ^ as most respondents answered
more than one question.

Although the Act has apparently made manufacturers cognizant
of their promotional costs and the value received for such, a large
ntunl5er of manufacturers (27.3/^) «till felt that the Act had no effect
on promotional allowances. In fact, three out of ten respondents felt
the same way. While the Act was intended to prevent ahuses "by causing
strict accountahility for performance of services and placing them on
proportionally equal teiros—the majority of the industry felt that such
was accomplished—and not to decrease the amount of legal promotional
services offered, over a third of the respondents felt that the Act
curtailed promotional allowances. Apparently the outlawing of illegal
allowances and the awakening of manufacturers as to value received for
services rendered, assuredly reduced these allowances.
Tahle No. 8
EFFECTS THE RQBIHSCW-PATMAN ACT ^ PRCMOTKmi ALLCWAITCSS
Whole- Mano- Associa-
Retailers salers Brokers facturers tions Average
Strict accounta-
Mlity for
performance 66. 2$^ 56.3^ 75- OJ^ 45. 5/^ 25. OJ^ 61.5^
Placed on pro-
portionally
equal terms 45.5 68.8 55.0 54.5 25.0 51.0
Placed on a true
cost hasis 22.1 37.5 55.0 18.2 50.0 31.1
Curtailed use 40.4 18.8 30.0 36.3 50.0 34.5
No effect 26.0 25.0 50.0 27.3 37.5 30.0
Totals - add to over 10(^ as most respondents checked more
than one item.
The argument that the Rohins on-Patman Act, "by seriously af-
fecting price and promotional allowances, would give great impetus to
the promotion of private "brands at the expense of national "brands was
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not only disproved "by leading authorities in the past, "but also "by the
respondents to the questioniiaire now under discussion. Less than a
fifth of the respondents felt that the Act wa« a major influence in
stimulating private branded merchandise while the remaining respondents
were equally divided as to whether the act exerted a minor or no influ-
ence on private "brands,
<
Tahle No. 9
EPgECT OP RCBIlTSacr-PATM/UjT ACT QCT STIMUIATING THE USE OP PRIVATE BRAITDS
No. of Maj or Minor No
Respondents Influence Influence Influence Total
Retailers 74 12.2^ 52. 75^ 35.1^ 100.0^
Wholesalers 26 34.6 46.2 19.2 100.0
Brokers 17 29.4 29.4 41.2 100.0
Manufacturers 10 10.0 0 90.0 100.0
Associations 8 0 21^ 7?.o 100.0
135
43. 05^ 39.2^ 100. OJ^Average 17. 85^
The last portion of the questionnaire was left blank for what-
ever comments respondents thought applicable. Most of the comments were
extremely partial toward the Act, thereby offering further proof of the
beneficial aspects of the Robins on-Patman Law.
Retailers wrote that the Act "had. a good moral effect—elimina-
ted flagrant abuses and favoritism", "has eliminated unfair trade prac-
tices and placed competition on a more equitable basis", "has no doubt
stopped some of the worst special discounts and allowances" and finally,
"a step in the right direction you must have rules to play by".
A few felt that "laws like the Robins on-Patman Act kill initiative; it
is not a bad idea for manufacturers to have freedom in offering advantages
to people that cooperate with them, but if the ones who cooperate are

penalized and the non-cooperative ones "benefit to the same extent, then
the system "breaks down". Others felt that "smaller stores that fail
usually fall "by the roadside "because of insufficient financing, lack of
knowledge of the business, lack of attention to duties and responsi"bili-
ties, etc., and not "because they have to pay 754 a dozen whereas their
competitor got it for 72^ a dozen".
"Very few manufacturers, "brokers and wholesalers made adverse
criticism of the law in the section set aside for comments. Of the few
adverse criticisms voiced by manufacturers, the following statement
seemed to echo the classical economists!
"the law is detrimental because larger chains and
cooperatives sell food cheaper, thereby benefitting
140,000,000 people while the law protects 5,000
Jobbersl The best for most people!"
Many manufacturers felt that the Act "stopped a lot of chiseling, rebates
and brokerage payments to buyers", "helped eqtialize the picture" and
"cut out the advantages that the big buyers held tmfairly".
Comments by brokers on the effects of the Act showed that it
"stabilized the industry by curtailing a definite trend toward monopoly
in production and distribution", benefited the consumer "by forced
competition in qiiality and price" and by the elimination of "extra
handling charges and fees added to final costs", and finally, gave "the
little fellow a chance to exist and eliminated kick-back money in large
volume to big buyers".
Wholesalers declared that the law "helped in a way for smaller
wholesalers or Individual merchants to buy merchandise on a more equal
basis compared to purchases made by big fellows", "opened independents'
eyes to allowances available" and "gave manufacturers better control of
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sales of merchandise".
An excellent o'bservation, a triliute to the Act and to the
Commission, which appears to sum up, in general, the opinion of the
entire food industry was voiced by a canner who stated that,
"The Eobinson-Patman Act, in our opinion, is an
excellent piece of legislation and was long over-
due at the time it was enacted to correct grave
trade abuses. Its general purpose was to eliminate
the securing of unfair price advantages by larger
distribution units. In general, these discrimina-
tory lower prices were secured, not because of
savings in costs of doing business with the mass
distributors, but because of the tremendous pur-
chasing power they had, used as a club to secure
discriminat ory treatment .
"
"Over a period of years, the FTC has slowly, but
steadily, proceeded to enforce the provisions of
the Act. It appears to us to be doing a good job
in gradually overtaMng and putting a stop to
trade abuses in many lines of business endeavor."

CHAPTER VI
Stunmary and Concluslona
The essence of the Robins on-Patman Act is the prohihition of
all price discriminations in any form—allowances, services, discounts,
rebates, etc.,—that are not "based on cost differences in the manufac-
ture, sale or delivery of commodities or that are not available on
proportionally eqtial terms to all buyers.
Before determining whether the competitive position of the
smaller food distributors is firmer as a result of the abolition of the
discriminatoiT- prsw:tlces that existed prior to the Act, it would be well
to ask what part these special discounts and allowances played in the
consistent ability of chains and other mass distributors to imdersell
independent wholesalers and retailers. The Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation , submitted by the P T C to Congress in December,
193^» scddi used as factual ammunition by the advocates of the Act, showed,
that of the 1.73/^ which independent's cost of merchandise exceeded
that of chains, only 0,45/^ could be traced to special concessions.
Since only \6,kio of the independent's higher selling price was the
result of greater cost—83. 6/^ caused by higher gross margin—the chains
would still continue to undersell the Independent even if the entire
(2)difference in merchandise cost were eliminated. ^
As a result of the Act, the Federal Trade Commission has
demonstrated the illegality of many of the practices that prevailed in
(1) Phillips, "The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimination Law and the
Chain Store", Harvard Business Review , Vol. XV, No. 1, Autumn, 1936,p. 63.
(2) Ibid., p. 6k
II
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the food distribution system prior to June 19, 1939. Sellers, "because
of large-order pressure, are no longer able to load their unabsorbed
costs onto less powerful and smaller customers. Special concessions
cannot be granted arbitrarily to certain customers and not to others.
All buyers, whether large or small, must be treated alike, and all must
bear their proportional share of the cost of the seller's operations.
Unfair brokerage allowances, fees and rebates are outlawed as unfair
methods of competition. Advantages resulting in large distributors
being able to draw more trade must be made available to small distrib-
utors on proportionally equal terms. The small buyer can insist that he
be treated fairly; he can demand that the game be played impartially; he
can legally force a seller to discontinue any deals which discriminate
against him and injure competition. In that unjustifiable concessions
are outlawed, independents do stand on firmer and stronger coinpetitive
grounds
.
The Act has had many effects on the food distribution system.
It has forced men to delve into the price labyrinth to find out what
they were doing. Accounting methods had to be surveyed to determine
distribution costs in order to judge whether differentials were warranted
by cost and whether various price and prcanotion policies were sound.
This scrutiny not only eliminated many discriminatory practices, but also
produced greater efficiency.
This housekeeping by manufacturers and distributors has re-
dTiced swollen qtiantity discount schedules to a point where discount
spreads are in line with economies secured from sales in quantity lots.
It has brought about the discontinuance of those cumulative discount

rebates not "based on costs and has eliminated unwarranted concessions
"based on total roltune purchased in a given period of time to the "benefit
of the particular companies involved. The selection and classification
of customers according to the trade functions performed is no longer a
careless act, but is an operation executed with greater prudence and
caution to insure price differentials "being lawful. The law allowed
many sellers an opportunity to revamp price and sales promotional pol-
icies which were undesirable though not necessarily in violation of the
Act. Advertising allowances and services are not indiscriminately
granted but are made with an eye on the "proportionally equal terms"
phrase of the Act. The furnishing of free deals, gratuities, demonsta-
tors, etc., has been limited. The practice of using separate contracts
for promotional and advertising services has been adopted, and manu-
facturers now insist upon strict accountability for the performance of
such services. The payment of brokerage commissions in any form or by
any means to buyers or to buying-brokers on that share of goods bought
for their own account has been outlawed. The provision of the law which
makes the buyer equally liable with the seller for knowingly indiicing or
receiving unlawful concessions has been effective in eliminating dis-
criminatory abuses. Purchaisers must be certgdn before completing any
deal that the same arrangements are available to all other buyers on
proportionally equal terms. Hence, a seller is better able to protect
himself from the demands for sacrificial price cuts coming from the most
voracious buyers. In addition, the fear that a firm's complete business
activities may be aired at public hearings on a Federal Trade Commission
co&iplaint has been an effective device in deterring discriminatory

practices. The law, therefore, has had "beneficial effects on the food
distribution system, not only "because it has produced fairer competition,
but also because it has emphasized greater knowledge of costs and prices
and has made necessary a broader prospective of the whole distribution
system on the part of each member of the system.
The Act has certainly not been the panacea some claimed it
would be and it has not equalized the chains and the independents. The
small buyer can neither receive the same quantity discount on purchases
nor advertise as extensively as larger competitors; and the prohibition
of unfair discriminations cannot conceivably place the small distributor
on an equal plane with the mass distributor. If all buying advantages
held by the mass food distributors were wiped out, they could still
undersell the independents because of savings obtained through integra/-
tion, specialization, and greater efficiency. The law does not aim to
level the advantages resulting from efficiency; it merely seeks to pre-
vent the enterprise thus favored from e:q)loiting its advantages to the
point of injuring or destroying competition. A premium is still placed
on efficiency and that firm which is the most progressive and most
efficient can still maintain its position in our competitive society.
The small wholesaler and retailer must bend every effort to be as effi-
cient as possible and must eacploit to the best of his ability his own
peculiar advantages such as personal contact with customers, service,
credit extension, progressive merchandising of perishables by retailers,
flexibility of operation, etc.
Apparently the Act had little or no effect upon the growth
of private branded merchandise. The desire of distributors to have
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control over their market, the greater profits Involved, the rise and
fall of private brands in the downward and upward trend of prices
respectively, consijjner preference, scarcity of materials during the war,
etc., have all affected the growth of private "brands. There are far
too many factors involved to point to one and say that it is the major
factor.
Likewise, there is no evidence that the Act stimulated vertical
integration. Such a decision is based on a variety of reasons and to
point to one influence, which could well be offset by another, would be
foolhardy.
Undoubtedly, there are still many discriminatory practices
prevailing in the food distribution system today since it is impossible
for the P T C to supervise the operations of every company. Offenders
are still being apprehended and tmfair competitive practices are being
abolished one by one. The Act has led to a voltune of work which oc-
cupies an important part of the docket of the PTC and which requires
lengthy and expensive investigations. This has resulted in the Commission
acquiring influence and respect among businessmen. As an administrative
body it has produced better work than most and has received needed stimuli
by many Court findings in its favor.
As it stands, the Robins on-Fatman Act is a good law from the
point of view of both consumer welfare and business progress. Neverthe-
less, one section of the Act should be altered either by administrative
and court interpretation or by legislative edict. Section 2 (c), the
brokerage provision, should be read or amended in order that the require-
ment of Section 2 (a), with respect to injury of competition, may apply.

The enforcement of soxy law which le enacted to preserve competition should
be tempered hy vigilance of its influence on public welfare. If a prac-
tice is not affecting competition and, in view of the practical circum-
stances involved, will not do so, there is no reason to punish anyone
or order said practice to be discontinued. One of the basic tenets of
our society is that an individual be guaranteed complete freedom of action
without intervention of any kind by any power or individual providing that
such action does not interfere with the rights smd privileges of his
neighbor. In the Biddle case, for example, the brokerage activities of
this long, established company should not have been outlawed unless injury
to competition was definitely established. Again in the Southgate com»-
plaint, the brokerage paid to this buji.ng-broker should have been pro-
hibited only if the practice clearly injured competition. If the broker-
age has no harmful effect on competition in any way, it should not be
outlawed merely because similar brokerage practices involving different
parties did injure competition. Section 2 (c) does definitely outlaw
those detrimental manifestations of brokerage payments, but it should
not ban those in which brokerage payments do not cause any damage to the
con^etitive system and to the public welfare. The Federal Trade Commission
and the courts should consider each case under Section 2 (c) \apon its own
individual facts.
In conclusion, let it be said that little difficulty would be
encountered if every b-u^er and every seller were to approach the Act
with a realistic effort to cassply with the intent of the law. But as
long as some firms attempt to gain unwarranted advantages of any kind,
laws such as the Robins on-Patman Act will continue to s^pear and in-
vestigations by government agencies will remain to plague business.

APPEHDIX
TEE RCBiysOy-PATMAIT ACT
1
PUBLIC No. 692 CONGEESS
H. E. mz
AN ACT
To amend section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act to supplement
existing laws against Tinlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other
purposes", approved October 15, 191^. as amended (U.S.C, title 15,
sec. 13), and for other purposes.
Be it enacted "by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That section 2 of
the Act entitled "An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes", approved October I5,
1914, as amended (U.S.C, title 15* sec. 13 ) is amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for a person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved
in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them; PR07IDED, That nothing herein contained shall prevent dif-
ferentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
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manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered: PROVIDED, HCWEVER, That the Federal Trade Commission may,
after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and
establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as
to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that
available purchasers in greater a.uantities are so few as to render
differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive
of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not
he construed to permit differentials based on differences in ouantities
greater than those so fixed and established; ABD PROVIDED FURTHER,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise In commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade:
AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price
changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions af-
fecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such
as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process,
or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods con-
cerned.
"(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services
or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case
thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with
a violation of this section, and \inless justification shall be affirmatively

shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination: PROVIDED, HOfSVER, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent a seller rehutting the prima facie case thus made "by showing that
his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any pur-
chaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished "by a competitor.
••(c) That it shall "be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept,
anything of value as a commission, "brokerage, or other cosapensation, or
any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered
in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise,
either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, represen-
tative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting
in fsict for or in "behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control,
of any party to such transaction other than the person "by whom such
con5)ensation is so granted or paid.
"(d) That it shall "be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the
"benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as
compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished
"by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling,
sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured,
sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or
consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
•*(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in
favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a

cooimodity "bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting
to furnish or furnishing, or hy contributing to the furnishing of, any
services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale,
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
"(f ) That it shall he unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such ccanmerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
SEC. 2. That nothing herein contained shall affect rights of action
arising, or litigation pending, or orders of the Federal Trade Commission
issued and in effect or pending on review, based on section 2 of said
Act of October 15, 191^, prior to the effective date of this amendatory
Act; PROVIDED, That where, prior to the effective date of this amenda-
tory Act, the Federal Trade Commission has issued an order requiring
any person to cease and desist from a violation of section 2 of said
Act of October 15. 191^. and such order is pending on review or is in
effect, either as issued or as affirmed or modified by a court of ccm-
petent jurisdiction, and the Commission shall have reason to believe
that such person has committed, used or carried on, since the effective
date of this amendatory Act, or is committing, using or carrying on,
any act, practice or method in violation of any of the provisions of
said section 2 as amended by this Act, it may reopen such original
proceeding and may issue and serve upon such person its complaint,
supplementary to the original complaint, stating its charges in that
respect. Thereupon the same proceedings shall be had upon such siq>>
plementary complaint as provided in section 11 of said Act of
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October 15» 191^» If "upon such hearing the Commission shall "be of the
opinion that any act, practice, or method charged in said supplementary
has "been committed, used, or carried on since the effective date of
this amendatory Act, or is heing committed, used or carried on, in
violation of said section 2 as amended hy this Act, it shsdl make a
report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts
and shall issue and serve upon such person its order modifying or
amending its original order to include any additional violations of
law 80 found. Thereafter the provisions of section 11 of said Act of
Octoher 15t 191^» as to review and enforcement of orders of the
Commission shall in all things apply to such modified or amended order.
If upon review as provided in said section 11 the court shall set aside
such modified or amended order, the original order shall not he affected
thereby, hut it shall he and remain in force and effect as fully and to
the same extent as if such supplemental'' proceedings had not been taken.
SEC. 3» It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his
knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount,
rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the
purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising
service charge available at the time of such transaction to said com-
petitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality and quantity;
to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United States at
prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the Uixited
States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a

competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to
sell, goods at tmreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
con5)etition or eliminating a con5)etitor.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall,
\apon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
SEC. 4. Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative association
from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the whole, or
any part of, the net earnings of surplus resulting from its trading
operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from, to, or
through the association.
Approved, Jtme 19, 19^6.
PUBLIC — No. 550 ~ 75th CCWGRESS
(Chapter 283 3d Session)
(H. S. 81/+8)
AN ACT
To amend Public Law Numbered 692, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE SEMTE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OP THE UNITED
STATES OP AMERICA IN CCNGrRBSS ASSEMBLED, That nothing in the Act approved
June 19, 1936 (Public, Numbered 692, Seventy-fourth Congress, second
session), known as the Robins on-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, shall
apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals and charitable insti-
tutions not operated for profit.
Approved, May 26, 1938»
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